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Notes
NO INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR MANAGERS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: EEOC v.
AIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, LTD.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),' a recent addition to a
growing list of anti-discrimination statutes, proscribes discrimination
against persons on the basis of a disability.2 Title I of the ADA addresses
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12189 (1994)).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b), 12112(a). The drafters set out the purpose of the
legislation as follows:
It is the purpose of this [Act]-(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforc-
ing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, in-
cluding the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id. § 12101(b). In enacting the ADA, Congress observed that the disabled were
historically isolated and segregated, and that such behavior continues today. Id.
§ 12101(a) (2), (3). The drafters also noted that the disabled usually had little
legal recourse for their mistreatment. Id. § 12101 (a) (4).
Because the power of Congress to regulate businesses arises under the United
States Constitution, the ADA only covers those entities which affect interstate com-
merce. SeeJAMES LEDVINKA & VIDA G. SCARPELLO, FEDERAL REGULATION OF PERSON-
NEL AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1-22 (1992) (outlining constitutional
limits on congressional regulation of employment practices). While most observ-
ers agree with the drafters that the ADA provides comprehensive protections,
there is no consensus on how "clear" the statute is. See Ellen O'Connell, Employ-
ment Issues Under the ADA, N.J. LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE, July 1995, at 13 (noting
number of "puzzling" court decisions regarding scope of "protected handicaps").
The ADA is only one of many employment anti-discrimination statutes. See,
e.g., The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on age); Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimina-
tion based on race, religion, gender, color and national origin). This Note will use
the term "anti-discrimination statutes" when referencing the ADA, the ADEA and
Title VII collectively, as they all use a similar definition of "employer." Compare 29
U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5) (A) (ADA). A more recent employment anti-discrimination statute is
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (prohibiting
employment discrimination based on need of temporary leave for childbirth,
adoption or family illness). For a comprehensive analysis of an employer's duties
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the rights of the disabled in the employment context.3 Under this Title,
employers are prohibited from discriminating against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability in the hiring, employment or termination processes. 4
under the FMLA, see RICHARD L. MARCUS, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE: POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES (1994). Also of note is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilita-
tion Act), which was the precursor to the ADA and in part concerned the rights of
the disabled in the employment context. 29 U.S.C. § 701; see alsO PETER DANZIGER,
REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 14-23
(1991) (outlining framework of Rehabilitation Act). The Rehabilitation Act pro-
hibits employment discrimination against the disabled by federal agencies or fed-
eral contractors. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Because the definition of "employer" is much
more limited under the Rehabilitation Act than the ADA, this Note will not in-
clude a discussion of the earlier Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act, how-
ever, may be helpful in interpreting other provisions of the ADA. Much of the
ADA is drawn from the Rehabilitation Act, as well as Title VII. See RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND IMPLE-
MENTING REGULATIONS 3 (1991) ("The ADA borrows much of its substantive
framework from § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and much of its coverage and
procedural framework from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."). The Fair
Housing Act Amendments of 1988 (FHAA) also address the rights of the disabled,
but in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619. Be-
cause the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the FHAA all concern the rights of the
disabled, there is some overlap. SeeJOHN PARRY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT MANUAL: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, EMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS 4 (1992) ("The legislation builds on existing federal laws."). All
three statutes use essentially the same definition of disability, so case law regarding
the two earlier statutes may be helpful in determining the scope of the definition
of disability. Id. at 4-5. Traditionally, courts have applied a liberal interpretation
of "disability," thus insuring a broad scope of protection. Id. at 4. The ADA is
farther reaching in its coverage than the Rehabilitation Act or the FHAA. Id. ("For
example, unlike section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA's coverage is not
limited to employers or public entities that receive federal funds."). Despite the
overlap, the ADA leaves intact the rights and duties required under the previous
statutes. Id. A discussion of the myriad of state and local statutes and ordinances
regarding the rights of the disabled is beyond the scope of this Note.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Title I). Title II addresses public services and
their accessibility to the disabled. Id. §§ 12131-12165. Title III concerns public
accommodations and the duties of private entities in providing services to the pub-
lic. Id. §§ 12181-12189. Title IV discusses telecommunication services. Id. §§ 255-
611. Title V contains miscellaneous provisions. Id. §§ 12201-12213.
Under the ADA, a person is disabled if he or she suffers from a:
(2) Disability. The term "disability" means, with respect to an individ-
ual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
Id. § 12102.
4. Id. § 12112(a).
The definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA is:
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall
be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before
2
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The ADA has attracted great public attention because the protections of
the ADA may extend to as many as 49 million Americans. 5 In the first
three years of the statute's enforcement, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) reported almost 50,000 charges under the
ADA's employment provisions, with the majority alleging discriminatory,
employment termination.6
As with any new statute, courts have been presented with the chal-
lenge of clarifying various aspects of the ADA, thereby defining its scope
and coverage. 7 In doing so, the scope of the term "employer" has arisen
as one of the more uncertain and controversial areas.8 The definition of
advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.
Id. § 12111(8).
5. Barbara S. Dimmitt, ADA: Revealing the Legal Impact, Shaping Employer Tac-
tics, 13 Bus. & HEALTH 27, 27 (1995). It is important to note that while the number
of disabled Americans is about 49 million, the number of disabled persons in the
work force is less. Id. The number of Americans between the ages of 16 and 67
who reported having some sort of work related disability is 19.5 million. Id.
6. Testimony of EEOC Commissioner Paul S. Miller to the U.S. Senate, July
26, 1995 available at 1995 WL 449209, at *1 (F.D.C.H.). The percentage of EEOC's
ADA charges involving employment charges is higher than that of Title VII. Id. at
*13. The majority of charges are brought by current or terminated employees, as
opposed to job applicants. Dimmitt, supra note 5, at 27. The largest share of com-
plaints that are filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) concerns back problems (19%) and the second largest are neurological
disorders (11%). Id. For a comprehensive guide to mental disorders and their
coverage under the ADA, see generally DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., THE ADA AND
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS (1993). Com-
missioner Miller declared that "EEOC enforcement of the ADA has been largely
successful." Testimony of EEOC Commissioner Paul S. Miller, supra note 6, at *8.
The EEOC has resolved 29,000 of the 50,000 employment discrimination charges
brought and has managed to achieve benefits for the charging parties in greater
proportions than for age, gender, national origin and race discrimination charges.
Id.
7. See, e.g., William C. Taussig, Note, Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination:
Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the
Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REv. 927, 934-39 (reporting controversy surrounding cov-
erage of ADA's and Rehabilitation Act's definitions of disability). Besides the issue
of what constitutes a disability, other definitions also are unclear and are continu-
ing to be resolved by case law. See Peter M. Panken, The Disabled and Work, C108
ALI-ABA 221, 244 (June 1, 1995) (predicting increase in litigation as to definition
of "essential functions" of job).
8. Joel E. Cohen, Individual Corporate Officer Liability, CORP. COUNS., Aug. 7,
1995, at S1 ("One of the hottest topics in employment law is whether officers,
managers, or supervisors at a company may be held individually liable for their
conduct in violation of the employment discrimination statutes .... "). The defi-
nition of "employer" under the ADA reads:
(A) In general
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
and any agent of such person, except that, for two years following the
effective date of this subchapter, an employer means a person engaged in
1996] NOTE
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"employer" is crucial to the application of the ADA and other employment
anti-discrimination statutes because it defines the entities from which a
plaintiff can recover.9 Although the ADA uses virtually the same defini-
tion of "employer" as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tide VII)
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), there is disagree-
ment under those two statutes about the scope of the "employer" defini-
tion.10 In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA of 1991") granted
an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or pre-
ceding year, and any agent of such person.
(B) Exceptions
The term "employer" does not include-
(i) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the govern-
ment of the United States, or an Indian tribe; or
(ii) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organi-
zation) that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (emphasis added).
This Note will use the term "individual liability" to mean the personal liability
of individuals who do not independently fit the definition of employer. See EEOC
v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
there is no dispute that individuals who personally employ 15 persons would be
employer under ADA). Those individuals who manage or supervise employees are
referred to as "agents" in the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111: see also EEOC, EEOC TECH-
NICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr 1-2 (1992)
[hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL] (giving examples of agents as
"managers, supervisors, foremen, or others who act for the employer"). While an
"agent" might itself be an employing entity such as a corporation, this Note will
focus on individual persons in their capacity as agents.
There are also other questions regarding the definition of employer, other
than individual liability. See Panken, supra note 7, at 247 (predicting increase in
litigation as to definition of "essential functions" ofjob). One example is a case in
which the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had to decide
whether "a self funded medical reimbursement plan that provides insurance to
cover its.., employees could be considered an employer covered by the ADA." Id.
(citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng-
land, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)). The court stated that an entity that is cre-
ated to provide services like medical insurance to an employer's work force is
"intertwined" with the employer, and thus covered within the scope of the ADA. Id.
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding plaintiff cannot bring Title VII claim against individual defendant be-
cause defendant was not employer under Title VII definition), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1049 (1994). An aggrieved party can only recover from a manager if he is
within the scope of "employer" under the ADA. Id. Therefore, the definitional
scope of employer has implications for the millions of Americans with managerial
positions who may be potential defendants, especially for those higher up on the
corporate chain of command who have numerous employees under their supervi-
sion. SeeJendusa v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006, 1011-12
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (supporting policy that any employee with supervisory status
should be held liable under ADA). For the definition of employer under the ADA,
see infra note 10 and accompanying text.
10. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Title VII), and 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (ADEA)
with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (A) (ADA) (showing all three statutes use same linguistic
definition of "employer"). The issue of individual liability under Title VII has been
well documented, with most of the commentators in favor of individual liability.
[Vol. 41: p. 785
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additional remedies to aggrieved parties in employment discrimination
cases, further complicating the process of determining the intent of the
drafters of the ADA in delineating the term "employer."1 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the
first circuit to address the issue of individual liability under the ADA.12 In
EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd. ("A/C Security'), 13 the EEOC urged
the Seventh Circuit to adopt a policy that would hold individual managers
and owners of companies personally liable for employment decisions that
See Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability for Employee/Agent
Defendants, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 39, 39 (1994) ("This article.., urges that individ-
ual liability is appropriate given considerations of both law and policy."); Phillip L.
Lamberson, Personal Liability for Violations of Title VI: Thirty Years of Indecision, 46
BAYLOR L. REv. 419, 430 (1994) ("The correct interpretation of Title VII is that it
does allow for the imposition of personal liability upon individuals."); Douglas L.
Williams, Individual Liability and Defending Individual Co-Defendants (Defendant's Per-
spective), C463 ALI-ABA 205, 218 (1989) ("The better view is that supervisors and
managers should be personally liable for backpay so as to further the purposes of
Title VII."); Scott B. Goldberg, Comment, Discrimination by Managers and Supervi-
sors: Recognizing Agent Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 571 (1994) (advo-
cating adoption of individual liability under Title VII); Christopher Greer, Note,
"Who, Me?": A Supervisor's Individual Liability for Discrimination in the Workplace, 62
FoRDAwm L. REv. 1835, 1850 (1994) ("To further advance the goals of Title VII
and the ADEA... individuals who act within their supervisory positions to render
discriminatorily motivated decisions [should be] held accountable.").
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Damages in cases of intentional discrimination in employment
(a) Right of recovery....
(2) Disability
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers,
remedies, and procedures set forth in ... the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (as provided in . . .the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 . . ., and [the Rehabilitation Act of 1973], respectively)
against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional dis-
crimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful be-
cause of its disparate impact) under [the Rehabilitation Act of
1973], or . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ...,
against an individual, the complaining party may recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of
this section, in addition to any relief authorized by... the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 .... from the respondent.
Id. § 1981a(a)(2). For a discussion of the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(CRA of 1991), see infra notes 132-41.
12. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280 ("[No Circuit has directly confronted the
question of individual liability under the ADA ... ."). The EEOC guidelines are
vague with regard to individual liability under the ADA. See EEOC TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1-2. The EEOC guidelines state that "[tihe
definition of 'employer' includes persons who are 'agents' of the employer ....
Therefore, the employer is responsible for actions of such persons that may violate
the law." Id. The guidelines do not state, however, whether the agent is individu-
ally liable. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.8 (1991) (defining employer under EEOC
regulations in same terms as ADA definition).
13. 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).
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violate the ADA. 14 The EEOC claimed that the language "a person ...
and any agent of such person" in the definition of "employer" includes
individual owners within its scope. 1 5 The Seventh Circuit declined to
adopt the EEOC's interpretation, ruling that there is no individual liability
under the ADA. 16 In support of its holding, the court cited both the lan-
guage in the ADA that limits the "employer" definition to larger businesses
and the weight of the case law regarding individual liability under the
other employment anti-discrimination statutes.'
7
14. Brief for the Appellee (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) at
35-36, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-
3839). AIC Security is the first ADA case in which the EEOC has itself filed suit.
Michael Zablocki, Symposium, Americans with Disabilities Act Update, 15 WHrrIER L.
Rv. 177, 179 (1994). The EEOC is the government agency responsible for ad-
ministering the ADA, as well as the other employment anti-discrimination statutes.
LEDVINKA & SCARPELLO, supra note 2, at 35-36. The EEOC investigates charges of
discrimination and determines whether there is probable cause to pursue the mat-
ter in question. Id. at 36. When the EEOC finds probable cause, the agency then
attempts "conciliation," a form of negotiation. Id. Even if conciliation fails, the
EEOC usually will not litigate a matter itself unless the matter has "favorable pros-
pects for the agency." Id.
In AIC Security, the aggrieved party, Charles Wessel, first filed a complaint with
the EEOC, and the EEOC continued its involvement as an actual plaintiff. A!C
Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. Wessel then intervened, and was also a named plaintiff,
but died soon after. Id. In Wessel's brief, he adopted the arguments of the EEOC
brief on the issue of individual liability. Brief for the Appellee/Cross Appellant
(Charles H. Wessel) at 16, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th
Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839). Because Wessel brought the charges to the EEOC, and
the EEOC litigated in the interest of Wessel and his survivors, the arguments of the
EEOC and Wessel will be referred tojointly as those of the EEOC throughout this
Note.
15. Appellee's Brief at 37, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A)). The EEOC stated that a plain language reading of the statute
supported the proposition that "any agent of a covered corporation is considered
an employer and a covered entity under the ADA." Id. Under the EEOC theory,
the individual defendant, Ruth Vrdolyak, was an agent of AIC Security Investiga-
tions, Ltd., and thus was a covered entity. Id. For a more complete discussion of
the EEOC's arguments, see infra notes 119-51.
16. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1288. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit also ruled on several other matters. Id. at 1278-79. Evidentiary
issues arose as to the admission of a taped deposition taken of Wessel before his
death, which the court refused to overturn as plain error. Id. at 1282-83. The
court also ruled that the district court properly instructed the jury to limit the
"direct threat" defense asserted by AIC Security to those direct threats that arise "in
the performance of an essential function of [Wessel's] job." Id. at 1283-85. AIC
Security successfully argued for a partial reduction of the award of attorney's fees
for Wessel's private attorneys, but the court upheld the awards of back pay, com-
pensatory damages and costs. Id. at 1285-88.
17. Id. at 1279-80. The court also noted that the ADA structure of restitution
was evidence that the drafters did not intend to include individuals within its
scope, even when the alterations of the CRA of 1991 were taken into account. Id.
at 1281. The court's holding was in line with the majority of circuit court cases
under Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at 1280. For a discussion of these cases, see
infra notes 23-50.
790
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This Note examines the holding and rationale of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in AIC Security.18 Part II of this Note reviews background
material including the circuit precedent concerning both Title VII and
the ADEA, which have similar definitions of the term "employer."'19 Part
II also outlines the split between district courts within the Seventh Circuit
on the scope of the term "employer" under the anti-discrimination statutes
and the Seventh Circuit's own indirect rulings in this area.2 0 In Part III,
this Note examines the Seventh Circuit's rationale in AIC Security and con-
trasts the Seventh Circuit's reasoning with that of the EEOC, other circuit
court holdings and previous district court rulings within the Seventh Cir-
cuit.21 Finally, Part IV of this Note concludes that the decision in A/C
Security will play a beneficial role in providing a consistent and reasonable
approach to individual liability under the ADA for other jurisdictions, as
well as providing guidance for business owners and managers regulated by
anti-discrimination statutes. 22
IL BACKGROUND: UNCERTAINTY FOR COURTS, MANAGERS AND OWNERS
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
A. Circuit Court Rulings Under Title VII and the ADEA
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to directly confront the
issue of individual liability under the ADA.23 Circuit courts, however, pre-
viously had ruled on individual liability under Title VII and the ADEA.24
18. See AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282 (holding "individuals who do not other-
wise meet the statutory definition of 'employer' cannot be held liable under the
ADA").
19. For a discussion of the circuit court decisions regarding individual liability
under the anti-discrimination statutes, see infra notes 23-50 and accompanying
text.
20. For a discussion of how the Seventh Circuit district courts have handled
the issue, as well as the varying results under Seventh Circuit review, see infra notes
51-98 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the rationale underlying the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in AIC Security in light of previous rulings and persuasive authority, see infra notes
119-87 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of AIC Security's potential influence in the area of employ-
ment discrimination, see infra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
23. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280. The Seventh Circuit had previously indi-
rectly confronted the issue. Id. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's varied
results regarding individual liability, see infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
24. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280 (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d
583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994)). The ADEA and
Title VII have the same definition of employer as the ADA; thus, rulings on the
scope of the term "employer" under the first two statutes are often used as persua-
sive authority for interpreting the ADA. See Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (noting that
liability claims under Title VII and ADEA are "essentially the same in aspects rele-
vant to [individual liability]").
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The majority of the circuit courts have found that there is no individual
liability under those statutes. 25
In Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc.,2 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there was no individual liability
under Title VII or the ADEA.2 7 The plaintiff, Phyllis Miller, alleged age
and sex discrimination against her employer, Maxwell's International, and
six individual defendants.2 8 The court dismissed the charges against the
25. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280. The AIC Security court tallied the score at
four circuit courts finding for individual liability and one against. Id.
26. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
27. Id. at 588. The court affirmed the dismissal of Title VII and ADEA claims
against defendants sued in their individual capacity. Id. But see id. at 588-90
(Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of imposing individual liability). The
Miller dissent advanced that the majority's "over broad language" would cloud the
issue of whether the CRA of 1991 has altered the scope of employer under Title
VII. Id. at 589 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The dissent also stated that the ADEA's
scope of remedies at the time of its enactment was much broader than Title VII,
because it already provided the same remedies as the CRA of 1991 added to Title
VII. Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
The Miller court was also confronted with a jurisdictional issue, as the plaintiff,
Miller, had failed to file a timely notice of appeal under the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure. Miller, 991 F.2d at 585-86 (citing FED. R. APp. P. 4(a) (1), (5)).
The court decided that Miller's delay was based upon an erroneous ruling by the
district court and thus, should not preempt Miller's action. Id. at 585. The court
also had to determine whether the district court had properly dismissed the ADEA
claims as time barred. Id. at 586. The court held that the ADEA claims were not
time barred because Miller had sufficiently alleged willful conduct in violation of
the ADEA and thus the time limits for filing a claim were extended. Id. The Equal
Pay Act, however, charges that Miller brought in addition to the Title VII and
ADEA claims were barred because Miller had not shown those violations to be
willful. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d) (1994) (codifying Equal Pay Act regarding
sex discrimination in wages). Moreover, the state law tort claim of intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress was barred by the state statute of limitations and lack
of evidentiary support showing outrageousness. Miller, 991 F.2d at 586 (relying on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). The state law tort claim of
emotional distress allows for individual liability. Id. Because the tort claim was
barred, however, the plaintiff's only hope to collect against the individual defend-
ants was under Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at 587.
28. Miller, 991 F.2d at 584. Miller was employed at Maxwell's Plum ("Plum"),
a restaurant corporately owned by Maxwell's International, Inc. Id. Miller alleged
that when she was first hired, she was assured that she would be promoted. Id.
Miller, however, was never promoted. Id. She claimed it was due to her sex and
age. Id. Miller also alleged that she worked in the capacity of a manager of a
section of the restaurant, but was not paid accordingly. Id. Furthermore, Miller
claimed that Stewart, the general manager of the restaurant, subjected her to a
hostile work environment and reduced her work hours. Id.
After Miller complained to her union about these actions, Plum fired Miller.
Id. Miller then filed charges with the EEOC and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). Id. After the NLRB intervened, Plum reinstated Miller. Id. Miller
then alleged that the second general manager, Glazzo, further harassed her in
retaliation for the EEOC and NLRB claims. Id. She was again terminated. Id.
After Glazzo and Stewart refused to write letters of recommendation, Miller filed
new charges with the EEOC. Id. Plum rehired Miller for a third time, but again
fired her. Id. Once again, Miller claimed there were retaliatory and discrimina-
tory motives for her termination. Id.
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individual defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. 29 The court stated that the statutory text of both Title VII and
the ADEA limit civil liability to the employer.3 0 Additionally, the court
noted that the definition of "employer" under Tite VII and the ADEA
limits the scope of coverage to employers with at least fifteen employees,
indicating that Congress did not intend to expose individuals to liability.3 1
Moreover, the court highlighted that the CRA of 1991 not only expanded
the forms of available restitution under the ADA, but also instituted a "slid-
ing cap system" that would limit the award based upon the size of the
After the EEOC granted Miller a right-to-sue letter,'she filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Id. at 585.
Miller named six individuals as defendants. Id. at 584. One individual was the
CEO of Maxwell's International, Inc., two were managers of the restaurant itself
and three were lower level employees. Id. The district court gave her four oppor-
tunities to present facts that stated a claim against the defendants, and after her
third amended complaint, the charges were dismissed. Id. at 585. The court then
improperly granted her an extension to alter or amend the judgment, which she
filed. Id. These later claims were also dismissed. Id.
29. Id. at 588. The District Court for the Northern District of California had
stated that it was unlikely that individuals were meant to be held liable under Title
VII or the ADEA. Id. at 587. The district court, however, refused to dismiss the
claim on that basis without more direct guidance from the circuit court. Id. The
United States District Court for the Ninth Circuit treated the question of individ-
ual liability as settled. Id. (relying on Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.
1982)). In Padway, the court had determined that defendants could not be held
liable in their individual capacity for back pay under Title VII. Padway, 665 F.2d at
968. The Miller court, however, did not discuss the issue further, noting that,
although fairly settled in the Ninth Circuit, the rule "conflicts with the reasoning
of some courts." Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
30. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e 5(g) (1988)). The majority stated that the term "agent" was included in
the definition of "employer" so as "to incorporate respondeat superior liability into
the statute." Id. (relying on Padway, 665 F.2d at 986). The court noted that
although the argument that the term "agent" includes individual liability was not
without merit, the court was "bound" by the Padway decision that precludes indi-
vidual liability for the types of remedies that Title VII originally provided. Id.;
Padway, 665 F.2d at 986. The court believed that the Padway decision was the bet-
ter rule, independent of its preclusive effect. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; Padway, 665
F.2d at 986. But see Miller, 991 F.2d at 589 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (stating that
expansion of remedies under CRA of 1991 to include damages may permit individ-
ual liability). While the Padway court held that there is no individual liability for
back pay under Title VII, the Padway decision took place before Congress enacted
the CRA of 1991. Id. at 587; Padway, 665 F.2d at 986. The Miller court, however,
stated that, even with the changes, the Padway decision was "still good law." Miller,
991 F.2d at 587.
31. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587. The court said that Congress's efforts to protect
small business owners are incompatible with the interpretation that an individual
employee may be held liable under the statute. Id. The court reasoned that Con-
gress had intended to protect "small entities [from] the costs associated with liti-
gating discrimination claims." Id. Because individuals usually have "limited
resources," the rationale for protecting small employers carries over to protect in-
dividuals as well. Id.
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employer, thus retaining the original protections for small employers.3 2
The court concluded by noting that the lack of individual liability under
Title VII and the ADEA would not lessen the existing disincentives for
managers to discriminate, even though the plaintiff argued that imple-
menting individual liability would further the purpose of the anti-discrimi-
nation statutes.33
Other circuit courts have held similarly to the Miller court.3 4 In Smith
v. Lomax,3 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that individuals do not fall within the definition of "employer" in
32. Id. at 587 n.2. The CRA of 1991 does not mention individuals in the slid-
ing cap system. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (A)-(D) (Supp. IV 1992)). The
sliding cap system limits the largest possible award that a plaintiff can collect
against an employer under the CRA of 1991 remedy structure. Id. The sliding cap
system follows this schedule:
Number of Employees: Damages Will Not Exceed:
15 - 100 $ 50,000
101 - 200 $100,000
201 - 500 $200,000
500 and more $300,000
EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 8, at X-8.
33. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588. The court stated that because the employer is held
liable under the statute, supervisory personnel would be discouraged from discrim-
inating in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. Id. The court noted that "[a]n
employer that has incurred civil damages because one of its employees believes he
can violate Title VII with impunity will quickly correct that employee's erroneous
belief." Id. The court therefore disagreed with the holding in Hamilton v. Rodgers,
791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986). Miller, 991 F.2d at 588. In Hamilton, the court stated
that releasing supervisors from individual liability would encourage supervisors to
violate Title VII. Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has since changed its position, and more recently stated that
there is no individual liability under the ADEA. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d
649, 653 (5th Cir.) (holding that agent cannot be individually liable under ADEA),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
34. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995).
The AIC Security court stated that "five Circuits have explicitly addressed individual
liability under Title VII and the ADEA .... One Circuit has recognized individual
liability." Id. But see Brief for the Appellee (Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission) at 37-38, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.
1995) (No. 93-3839) (citing Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747,
752 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing case that grants individual liability at circuit level);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (suggesting possible
individual liability for Title VII sexual harassment as agent's actions not of delega-
ble nature)).
35. 45 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Title VII and the ADEA.3 6 In Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.,37 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under the ADEA,
"agents" are not individually liable for discrimination against employees
even if the agent has decision-making power.3 8 Likewise, in Grant v. Lone
Star Co., 39 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said an
agent is not individually liable under Title VII.40 In Grant, the court be-
36. Id. at 403. The plaintiff, Alice Smith, was a white female, employed as a
clerk for the Board of County Commissioners of Fulton County ("Board"). Id.
The Board voted to replace her at the end of her six-year term with an African-
American female. Id. Smith sued the Board for violating Title VII and the ADEA.
Id. She also sued two African-American members of the Board in their individual
capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), claiming they had denied her equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Smith. 45 F.3d at 403, The court stated
that the amended complaint also brought suit against the two individuals under
Title VII and the ADEA. Id. at 403-04 n.4. The court did not allow the Title VII
and ADEA claims to be brought against the individuals. Id. The court reasoned
that because Fulton County was her employer, the two individuals could not also
be her employer. Id. (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.
1991)). While the court released the individuals from liability under Title VII and
the ADEA, the court did not grant the individuals either legislative or qualified
immunity from the § 1983 claims. Id. at 404-05. The § 1983 charges concern the
liability of legislative persons, and not those private individuals who fit the tradi-
tional supervisor or owner definition in the private sector employer/employee
context. Therefore, an in depth discussion of § 1983 is beyond the scope of this
Note.
37. 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994).
38. Id. at 510-11. The plaintiffs were two former supervisors at the employing
entity Marvel Lighting Corp. Id. at 509. Both were laid-off by a vice-president of
Marvel. Id. They alleged that their age was the major factor in the decision, be-
cause they were both the oldest supervisors on the floor of the plant. Id. The
managers sued their former employer, Marvel, and the vice-president as an individ-
ual, for violating the ADEA. Id. The jury did not find that the defendants willfully
violated the ADEA, and the trial court therefore ruled in favor of the defendants
on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first addressed the issue of whether the
vice-president was a proper defendant under the ADEA. Id. at 510. The court
decided that to hold individuals liable would "place a heavy burden on those who
routinely make personnel decisions for enterprises employing twenty or more per-
sons, and we do not read the statute as imposing it." Id.
39. 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. Id. at 651. The plaintiff in Grant was a female sales representative at Lone
Star Co. Id. at 650. She alleged that her manager, Mitchell Murry, and other male
employees sexually harassed her. Id. at 651. She claimed that Murry, other em-
ployees and visitors to the offices made sexually explicit jokes, rude comments and
engaged in other offensive behavior. Id. at 650. After the plaintiff received a right
to sue letter from the EEOC, she sued the corporate entity, Lone Star, and
amended the complaint to include various individuals as defendants in the suit.
Id. at 651. Ajury found only Murry liable as an individual. Id. The district court
held Murry liable for back pay, attorney's fees and expenses totaling over $70,000.
Id. Murry appealed the ruling, challenging his individual liability under Title VII.
Id. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Murry and refused to impose liability for private
individuals under Title VII. Id. (citing Clanton v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 649 F.2d
1084 (5th Cir. 1981)). The court noted the amount of case law that supported
such a holding. Id. at 652 (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 584
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994); Busby, 931 F.2d at 772; Harvey v.
11
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lieved that employer liability insures that agents will not be permitted to
discriminate with impunity.41
The sole circuit that presently recognizes individual liability under the
anti-discrimination statutes is the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, as demonstrated in Jones v. Continental Corp.42 PlaintiffJones
alleged racial and sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII by her
employer, The Continental Corporation, and two individuals.43 The trial
court dismissed the case on the merits, concluding that the complaint
failed to specify the legal foundation for the lawsuit against the individual
defendants. 44 The trial court then assessed costs and attorney fees against
Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1990); Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th
Cir. 1982)). The court also noted that the structure of Tite VII does not include
individuals and exempts small entities, thus supporting the concept of protecting
individuals from liability. Id. at 653. The plaintiff pointed out that the individual
defendant had the authority to hire, fire and keep employment records. Id. She
stated that Murry should then be held liable as an employer under Title VII be-
cause he had the full power to act as the employer. Id. The court disagreed and
stated "[n]ot all agents have the power to hire and fire, yet [T]itle VII contem-
plates employer liability for their behavior because they are agents. Thus, [the
plaintiff's] reading would require us to treat some employees as both an employer
and an employee. We reject this illogical reading." Id.
41. Id. The court stated that "[T]ile VII contemplates liability for the em-
ployer, which has the ability to discipline the employee." Id. (citing Miller, 991
F.2d at 588).
42. 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court's award of attorney fees to the defend-
ant was unwarranted. Id. at 1233. The defendant had claimed that the Title VII
charges could not have been sustained against him in his individual capacity, and
that the plaintiff should not have included him in the suit. Id. at 1229. The court
held that it was possible to sue an individual under Title VII, and that "any award
of attorney's fees based solely on failure to amend the complaint [to include a
basis for individual liability] as requested was error." Id. at 1232.
43. Id. at 1227 n.1. The Continental Corporation was the corporate owner of
the plaintiff's employer, The Continental Insurance Company. Id. The two indi-
vidual defendants were "supervisory employees." Id. Plaintiff Jones, an African-
American female, alleged violations of Title VII and § 1981. Id. at 1227. She had
worked for The Continental Insurance Company for several years, during which
she was steadily promoted from a clerk to an underwriter. Id. at 1228. Jones sued
The Continental Insurance Company, alleging that her employer racially discrimi-
nated against her, denied her promotions repeatedly, did not allow her to sell
products to other employees during work hours that white employees were allowed
to sell and isolated her desk away from white employees. Id. The Continental
Insurance Company fired Jones after she sent a letter to the company's largest
local client, accusing the client of "hate and prejudice." Id. The district court
found that Jones only proved a prima facie case with regard to the allegation that
she was passed-over for a promotion in favor of a white transferee. Id. The district
court dismissed the rest of the allegations on the merits. Id.
44. Id. at 1227. The complaint alleged violations of Title VII against the em-
ployer corporation, as well as the individual supervisors. Id. at 1227 n.1. The indi-
vidual defendants argued that because individuals are not liable under Title VII,
the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at
1231.
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Jones for litigating in bad faith. 45 Jones appealed the dismissal of her
claim and sought reversal of the award of costs and attorney fees to the
defendants. 46 In a previous ruling, the court had affirmed the dismissal
on the merits. 47 Here, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed the award of
attorney fees and costs to the defendants. 48 The court stated that because
individuals could be held liable under Title VII and § 1981, the legal foun-
dation for the suit against the individuals was the same as for the suit
against the corporation. 49 Although the Sixth Circuit did not actually
hold the defendants liable under Title VII, the court directly recognized
individual liability under that statute.50
45. Id. at 1228. The trial court found that Jones had litigated in "bad faith"
and that her counsel was "unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the litigation."
Id. The court ruled against Jones and her counsel under the guise of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988), respectively, and also under the
court's "inherent powers to punish those who litigate in bad faith." Continental
Corp., 789 F.2d at 1228 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752
(1980)). The court also assessed costs against the plaintiff. Id. The district court
found that the evidence Jones offered was "insubstantial," and that the "plaintiff
could be a quite petty person who assumed that anything that did not suit her was
a product of racial prejudice." Id. at 1228 (relying on Jones v. Continental Corp.,
No. 82-3572, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Tenn. June 29, 1984)).
46. Id. at 1227-28. Jones alleged that the district court's "failure to find dispa-
rate treatment was clear error." Id. at 1228.
47. Id. at 1227 n.1. The Sixth Circuit agreed with "the district court's conclu-
sion that the only defendant with potential liability was the employer insurance
company, and [affirmed] that court's dismissal of the claims against the other
named [individual] defendants." Id. (citing Jones v. Continental Corp., 785 F.2d
308 (6th Cir. 1986)).
48. Id. at 1233.
49. Id. at 1231. The district court partly relied on "the failure to specify under
which statute the individual defendants (as opposed to the employer) were being
sued" to justify granting the attorney fees to the defendant. Id. The Sixth Circuit
stated "[s]ince the individual employees sued were at least arguably 'agents' of the
employer, we think it obvious thatJones's counsel were intentionally and properly
seeking recovery against the individuals under both [Title VII and § 1981]." Id.
The defendants disputed the two charges as unclear, arguing that there is no indi-
vidual liability under the statutes. Id.
50. Id. The court stated that:
[T]he law is clear that individuals may be held liable for violations of
§ 1981, e.g., Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1200 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Section
1981 applies to all types of racial discrimination, public or private");
Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 957 (5th Cir. 1975) (individual director
held liable while corporation exonerated); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc. v.
Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993, 1008 (S.D. Texas 1981) ("pri-
vate citizens are proper defendants" in suits under § 1981), and as
"agents" of an employer under Title VII.
Id. (citing Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1980); Robson v. Eva's Super
Market, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 862-63 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Munford v. James T.
Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157, 158 (S.D. Ohio 1976)). Id. It is important to note that the only
circuit case the court cited in support of the proposition that Title VII includes
individuals in its definition of employer, however, was a case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Id. (citing Owens, 636 F.2d at 286
(holding individual "agent" can constitute employer for Title VII purposes)).
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B. Rulings Under the ADA, ADEA and Title VII Within the Seventh Circuit
The issue of individual liability under the anti-discrimination statutes
was an even greater point of conflict among the district courts in the Sev-
enth Circuit than among the appellate courts. 51 For example, although
numerous district courts granted individuals immunity from liability
under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA,52 other district courts ruled that
individuals are within the scope of the statutes.5 3 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued conflicting decisions regarding the
matter.
54
In Jenusda v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Inc. ("CTCA"), 5 the
plaintiff brought an ADA suit following his termination after he reported
to his employer that he had multiple sclerosis. 5 6 The United States Dis-
The law regarding individual liability in the Tenth Circuit is unclear as of yet.
See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995)
(relying on Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993)). The
AIC Security court stated that the Tenth Circuit case of Sauers v. Salt Lake County
brought the Tenth Circuit into line with the majority view, holding that there is no
individual liability under Title VII. Id. The AIC Security court noted, however, that
the question of individual liability may be unresolved in the Tenth Circuit. Id.
(relying on Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995)). In Bal4 the court deter-
mined that there might be liability for individual supervisors under Title VII. Bal4
54 F.3d at 667. The individual defendant in Ball, however, was held not to have a
supervisory position over the plaintiff. Id. at 668. The Tenth Circuit stated that it
"need not, and [does] not seek to resolve the open question." Id. Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit itself does not believe that the question of individual liability is set-
tled. Id.
51. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280. The court stated that "[n]umerous district
court decisions in this Circuit have addressed the question of individual liability
under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA." Id. Although the Seventh Circuit had
never explicitly ruled on individual liability, it upheld awards against individuals
under the ADA, the ADEA and Title VII in previous rulings. Id. at 1280 n.3.
52. Id. at 1280 (citing Hudson v. Soft Sheen Prod., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 132
(N.D. Ill. 1995);Johnson v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 844 F. Supp. 466 (N.D.
Ind. 1994)). For a discussion of Soft Sheen and Johnson, see infra notes 66-76 and
accompanying text.
53. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280 (citing Jenusda v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of
Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp.,
824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1993)). For a discussion of Jenusda and Vakharia see
infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text. See alsoJenusda, 868 F. Supp. at 1008-09
(listing Northern District of Illinois cases that demonstrate divisive split on issue).
54. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280 n.3 (citing DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53
F.3d 793, 796 (7th Cir. 1995); Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., 966 F.2d 320,
324 (7th Cir. 1992); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990);
Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1989); Huebschen v. Depart-
ment of Health & Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 1983)). For a discus-
sion of these cases, see infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text. See also EEOC v.
Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding Title VII claims against individ-
ual while remaining silent on issue).
55. 868 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
56. Id. at 1008. PlaintiffJenusda was the Vice President of Human Resources
at Cancer Treatment Center of America ("CTCA"). Id. Jenusda had worked for
CTCA for over three years when he informed the President of CTCA that he had
multiple sclerosis and asked for his work week to be reduced to 40 hours on a
14
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trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois permitted the employee to
sue the owner of CTCA in his individual capacity. 57 In recognizing indi-
vidual liability under the ADA, the court noted that a plain language read-
ing of the statute includes "agents" in the definition of "employers," thus
supporting individual liability.58 The district court rejected the argument
that the limitation of the definition of "employer" to those employing fif-
teen or more persons shows Congress's intent to limit liability against indi-
viduals.59 The court, however, had difficulty explaining why the CRA of
1991 caps did not include individuals, but preferred to rely on the policy
temporary basis. Id. Jenusda was fired two days later. Id. Jenusda sued CTCA and
Midwestern Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Midwestern"), its parent corporation,
as well as Richard Stephenson in his individual capacity. Id. at 1007. Stephenson
was the Board Chairman and principal owner of CTCA and Midwestern and had
personally participated inJenusda's firing. Id. at 1008. Stephenson moved for dis-
missal of the complaint against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing that as an individual, he was not a covered entity under the
ADA. Jenusda. 868 F. Supp. at 1007.
57. Jenusda, 868 F. Supp. at 1007. The court stated:
[T] he question of individual liability under these federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes does not readily admit of any easy answers. [T]his court con-
curs with what appears to be the minority view in this district and finds
that Congress' intent in enacting the ADA is best effectuated by holding
that agents of an employer may be individually liable for engaging in un-
lawful discrimination.
Id. at 1010. The court pointed out that there are two situations in which the dis-
trict courts have imposed individual liability. Id. at 1010 n.6 (citing DeLuca, 857 F.
Supp. at 608). They are:
(1) Where the individual was a decisionmaking employee with respect to
the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff and the adverse
action was not mandated by company policy determined by somebody
else; and
(2) Where the individual defendant was, in effect, the employer or alter-
ego of the employer.
Id. (citingJanopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., 835 F. Supp. 459, 461 (N.D. Ill.
1993); Vakharia, 824 F. Supp. at 785).
58. Id. at 1010. The court stated that such an interpretation was consistent
with Congress's intent to discourage discrimination. Id. The Jenusda court also
pointed out that the Seventh Circuit had repeatedly interpreted Title VII broadly
because of its remedial nature. Id. at 1011 (citing Philbin v. General Elec. Capital
Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1991)).
59. Id. at 1013. The court found that Congress considered many factors when
creating the 15-person limitation, notjust protecting small businesses. Id. at 1014.
The court stated that it could not conclude that "the desire to protect small busi-
nesses from the costs of defending against a charge of discrimination was of para-
mount importance in defining the term 'employer."' Id. The court stated that
additional reasons for the exclusion of small businesses could have been "protect-
ing the associational rights of 'mom and pop' or neighborhood businesses, or with
not overburdening small businesses with administrative expenses." Id. The court
also maintained that even if Congress intended to protect small businesses from
the costs of litigating discrimination claims, the statute does not necessarily show
that it intended to shield individuals in large companies from liability. Id.
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reasons supporting broad interpretation. 60 The court held that under the
ADA, an action may be maintained against "decisionmaking personnel.161
In Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospita46 2 the same court held individ-
uals liable under Title VII, the ADEAand § 1981 for their own discrimina-
tory acts while acting as an agent for an institution. 63 The court stated
that such an interpretation conforms with the statutes' goal of preventing
discrimination. 64 Additionally, the court pointed out that permitting em-
ployees to sue managers in their individual capacity provides a remedy for
victims of discrimination when the business entity has gone into
bankruptcy. 65
60. Id. at 1015. The court wrote:
This argument has given the court considerable pause; however, in the
end-after considering the antidiscrimination statutes' broad remedial
purposes and the importance of providing a meaningful deterrent to em-
ployment discrimination-the court finds the argument insufficient to
justify eviscerating what we regard to be Congress' plain statement that
"agents" [are individually liable].
Id. The court further noted that:
[1]n the almost thirty years since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, there has been no significant decline in discrimination-although
it may now manifest itself in more subtle forms. In fact... Congress has
recognized that discrimination continues to plague the workplace by en-
acting additional antidiscrimination statutes . . .in its broad efforts to
eradicate discrimination.
Id. at 1017 n.14.
61. Id. at 1017. The court, in holding the defendant liable in his individual
capacity, noted that the individual defendant had "participated directly in
Jenusda's termination" and, thus, was a decision-making agent. Id. at 1008.
62. 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
63. Id. at 784-85. The plaintiff in Vakharia was a female anesthesiologist who
was born in Bombay, India. Id. at 772. She worked at the defendant hospital for
15 years, but claimed that later in her career she was given fewer cases. Id. Her
hospital privileges were eventually suspended. Id. Vakharia sued the hospital, the
American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA), 39 individuals "affiliated with the
Hospital or the ASA" and unnamed members of the Hospital Board. Id. She sued
all the defendants under Title VII, alleging discrimination against her based on
color, race, gender and national origin, and sued under the ADEA alleging age
discrimination. Id. at 772-73. She also sued the defendants under federal antitrust
laws and state-law contract theory. Id. at 772. Vakharia twice amended her com-
plaint, adding new defendants and new charges. Id. In a previous opinion in this
case, the court held that "a defendant may be liable under Title VII and § 1981
even if the defendant is not the plaintiff's employer." Id. at 784 (citing Vakharia v.
Swedish Covenani Hosp., 765 F. Supp. 461, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1991)). In this proceed-
ing, the court stated that the same rule applies to the ADEA, although the issue
was not directly raised. Id. The court, in clarifying its previous opinion, also held
that an individual may be liable "when the defendant was acting for someone else."
Id.
64. Id. at 786. The court maintained that Title VII "always has served two
purposes: to compensate the victims of discrimination (at least with back pay, if
not with full compensatory damages), and to deter discrimination in the future."
Id. at 785. The court reasoned that holding individuals liable would promote these
purposes. Id.
65. Id. at 786. The court stated that "ordinarily personal liability is not of
great consequence either to the plaintiff or to the individual defendant," presuma-
[Vol. 41: p. 785
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In Hudson v. Soft Sheen Products, Inc.,66 two female employees brought
Title VII sexual harassment charges against their employer and their su-
pervisor in his individual capacity. 67 This time, the district court granted
the supervisor's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that, as an
individual, he was not subject to Title VII liability.68 The district court
focused on whether the CRA of 1991 altered the scope of the "employer"
definition when it broadened the scope of the available remedies under
Title VII.69 The court agreed with the Miller court's reasoning that be-
cause the CRA of 1991 made no mention of expanding the scope of cov-
ered entities, it was unlikely that Congress intended to do So. 70 The court
also rejected the notion that the court must interpret the term "employer"
broadly to effectuate Title VII's purpose in eradicating discrimination,
leaving resoultion of this issue to the legislature. 71 Ruling in favor of the
bly because of the deeper pockets of the employing entity. Id. at 785-86. The
court, however, noted that individual liability would preserve the plaintiff's rights
to recover when bankruptcy makes it impossible to recover from the employing
entity. Id. at 786.
66. 873 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
67. Id. at 133. The plaintiffs sued their supervisor, the Soft Sheen corporation
and a Soft Sheen Products vice president for Title VII violations, negligent reten-
tion and battery. Id.
68. Id. at 138. The court only ruled on the Title VII charges against the indi-
vidual supervisor. Id. The common law charges still stood against both the corpo-
ration and the individual. Id.
69. Id. at 134. The individual defendant, Allen, in arguing that Title VII does
not expose him to individual liability, relied mainly on the ruling in Weiss v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Ill. 1991), where the court ruled that the
"agent" language in Title VII served the sole purpose of insuring that respondeat
superior would be incorporated into the statute. Soft Sheen, 873 F. Supp. at 134.
One basis for the court's interpretation was that under the original ADA remedy
structure, the remedies were those that an employer could grant, but not an indi-
vidual supervisor. Id. Since this ruling, however, Congress has enacted the CRA of
1991 which altered the available remedies to include those that are available from
individuals, such as damages. For a discussion on the expansion of remedies
under the CRA of 1991, see infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
70. Soft Sheen, 873 F. Supp. at 135. The court also noted that the CRA of 1991
instituted a sliding cap system and that it made no mention of individual liability.
Id. The plaintiffs argued that a broad reading of Title VII under the CRA of 1991
was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the anti-discrimination laws. Id. at 135-
36. The court instead looked at the structure of the statute and its extensive legis-
lative history. Id. at 138. The court said "we find that Congress made no reference
to expanding Title VII liability to include individuals in their individual capacity...
. Given the noise of the federal courts [on the issue of individual liability], we do
not believe that Congress expected to change the law with silence." Id. The court
also noted that those opposed to the bill made arguments against the bill in almost
every way possible. Id. The court believed that the fact the opponents did not
address the potentially divisive issue of individual liability indicated that the draft-
ers did not intend to include such a provision. Id.
71. Id. at 136. The court stated that the effectiveness of Title VII is "a ques-
tion for the legislature, not the courts, to answer." Id. The court, however, did not
go so far as to say that such an interpretation was unnecessary, but rather left the
decision to others. Id.
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supervisor, the court flatly stated that "there is no individual liability under
Title VII."' 72
In Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.,73 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana stated that there is no
individual liability under Title VII even though the defendant was an
"agent," because inclusion of the term "agents" under the definition of
"employer" was intended only to incorporate respondeat superior liability
into Title VII.74 The court used a textual analysis of the statute to support
a finding that there was no liability for individuals under Title VII.75 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that because employers are already liable, there
is little incentive for managers to discriminate even if they are not person-
ally liable. 76
The confusion amongst the district courts was predictable because
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided little guidance. 77 In
72. Id. The court went on, in dicta, to discuss the legislative history of Title
VII. Id. In debating an earlier version of Title VII, neither the Senate majority nor
the minority discussed individual liability under Title VII. Id. The House majority
and minority, according to the Soft Sheen court, also failed to mention the issue of
individual liability. Id.
73. 844 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
74. Id. at 469. The plaintiff in Johnson was a part-time customer service repre-
sentative for the employing entity defendant. Id. at 466-67. The plaintiff sued the
employer, as well as her supervisor in her personal capacity, for terminating her on
the basis of her race. Id. The defendants made various procedural objections, and
the individual defendant argued she should not be held personally liable under
Title VII. Id. at 467. The court agreed, relieving the individual from liability. Id.
at 470.
75. Id. at 469. The court looked at the language of Title VII in the definition
of employer. Id. The court noted that the use of the conjunctive "and" instead of
"or" in the phrase "and any agent of such a person" supports the conclusion that
the terminology was included to provide respondeat superior liability for employ-
ers. Id. The court stated that "'[i] t has been held that the disjunctive 'or' usually,
but not always, separates words or phrases in the alternate relationship, indicating
that either of the separating words may be employed without the other."' Id.
(quoting NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14 (5th ed.
1992)). The court, therefore, believed this suggested that the "agent" language
was not meant to stand alone and create a new liable entity in individuals, but was
rather tied to the employer's liability. Id. Moreover, the court found that the limi-
tation of "employer" to those employing 15 or more also supported this reading
because there was an intent to protect small entities and, presumably, individuals.
Id. This further supported the court in avoiding the problem that the Seventh
Circuit cautioned courts against: "rely[ing] too heavily on disjunctive form versus
conjunctive form when deciding difficult issues." Id. (citing Kelly v. Wauconda
Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270 n.1 (7th Cir. 1986)).
76. Id. The court emphasized that because the employer is liable under Title
VII, it would not want to employ managers that would subject it to liability. Id.
Thus, "potential termination from liable employers exists as an effective deter-
rent." Id.
77. SeeJenusda v. Cancer Treatment Ctr. of Am., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 1006,
1008-09 (N.D. 111. 1994) (stating that "[i]n the absence of any clear guidance by the
Court of Appeals, a split has developed with respect to this issue among the courts
of the Northern District of Illinois"); see also Soft Sheen, 873 F. Supp. at 134 n.1
(noting that Seventh Circuit has not explicitly ruled on individual liability). For a
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several cases, the Seventh Circuit, without directly addressing the issue, did
not hold individuals liable under the anti-discrimination statutes.78 In
DeLuca v. Winer Industries, Inc.,79 the plaintiff sued his employer and sev-
eral managers for ADA violations.80 The district court held that individu-
als were not liable under the ADA and dismissed the claim against the
individual defendants.8 1 The plaintiff did not appeal the district court's
dismissal of the ADA charges against individuals.82 As such, the Seventh
Circuit did not comment on, nor disagree with, the district court's
findings.8 3
In Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Services,84 the Seventh
Circuit appeared to disagree with individual liability under Title VII.8 5
Here, the parties agreed that the plaintiff could not sustain a Title VII suit
discussion of the district court cases within the Seventh Circuit, see supra notes 55-
76 and accompanying text.
78. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.3 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 1995); Heub-
schen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983)).
79. 53 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 1995).
80. Id. at 796. In DeLuca, the plaintiff charged both the corporation and the
senior managers in their individual capacity with violating the ADA by terminating
him because of his multiple sclerosis. Id. The plaintiff had been a salesperson for
the defendant employer. Id. at 795. He alleged that over the course of his illness,
the managers created a hostile work environment, would not assist him in his job
and eventually terminated him. Id. at 796.
81. Id.
82. Id. DeLuca only appealed the ruling of summary judgment in favor of the
employing entity, Winer Industries. Id. DeLuca asserted that he had established a
prima facie case against the employer. Id. at 797-98. The Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed and concluded that DeLuca had not made out such a case. Id. at 798. To
make out a "prima facie case," the plaintiff must show that: "(1) [plaintiff] is a
member of a protected class; (2) [plaintiff's] work performance met the em-
ployer's legitimate job expectations; (3) [plaintiff's] employment was terminated";
and (4) plaintiff was treated less favorably in his termination, if there was a general
down-sizing in effect. Id. at 797 (footnote ommited). This is the "McDonell-Douglas
test," developed for Title VII and applied here under the ADA. Id.; see McDonell-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing requirements for
prima facie case of Title VII discrimination and formulating burden-shifting
method of proof). When an employee makes out a prima facie case against an
employer, the burden shifts to the employer to show that there was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination. DeLuca, 53 F.3d at 797. If
the employer can show this, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that
the reason was not credible and was merely a pretext for discriminating against the
plaintiff. Id.
83. DeLuca, 53 F.3d at 796. The Seventh Circuit merely stated that the dismis-
sal of ADA claims against the individuals was a "decision DeLuca has not ap-
pealed." Id.
84. 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 1170. Although the issue was not disputed, the court did indepen-
dently state that individuals were not covered under Title VII. Id. The plaintiff
brought suit under § 1983, based upon Title VII claims against his employer for
sex discrimination, and the defendant claimed that only Title VII applied, not§ 1983. Id. The court did not reach that question because it stated that to sue
under § 1983 for a Title VII violation, the defendant must have been liable under
19
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against an individual, as individuals were not included within the scope of
"employer"; instead, the plaintiff brought a second § 1983 claim.86 The
Seventh Circuit, however, denied the plaintiff § 1983 recovery because
§ 1983 could not impose liability on those outside the scope of liability for
Title VII. 87 The court concluded that because the individual defendants
were not liable under Tide VII, they were not liable under § 1983, imply-
ing that Tide VII does not impose individual liability.
88
The Seventh Circuit, however, had also upheld awards against individ-
uals under the anti-discrimination statutes.8 9 In Price v. Marshall Erdman
& Associates,90 the court affirmed damages against an individual under the
ADEA.91 The Seventh Circuit did not find it problematic that the jury had
Title VII. Id. The court said the defendant "was not an employer and, thus, did
not violate Title VII." Id. Therefore, the § 1983 claim could not stand alone. Id.
86. Id. The court noted that "[b]oth parties agree that Huebschen could not
have maintained an action against [the individual defendant] under Tide VII be-
cause she was not an 'employer' within the meaning of [Title VII]." Id. The plain-
tiff attempted instead to bring § 1983 charges against the individual defendant.
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 does not grant any substantive rights to
an employee. Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1170 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)). The court outlined the requirements of
a § 1983 action as a showing of "a depravation of rights, privileges, or immunities
'secured by the Constitution and laws."' Id. (quoting Chapman, 441 U.S. at 617-
18). In Huebschen, the "substantive basis of the § 1983 claim [was] a violation of
Title VII." Id. Therefore, § 1983 is not itself an employment law, but rather an-
other way to sue under existing employment law. Id. Section 1983 has slightly
different procedures for bringing an action, but the court stated that a cause of
action under § 1983 must be the same as under the statute a plaintiff relies on for
his or her substantive right. Id. The court noted that § 1983 does not expand the
rights of an employee, and therefore, if an employee is unable to sue under Title
VII, an employee is unable to sue under § 1983. Id.
87. Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1170. The plaintiff had brought Title VII charges
against the Department of Health and Social Services and § 1983 charges against
the individuals. Id. at 1169. In agreeing with the district court that the individual
defendants were not liable under Title VII, the court denied the plaintiff relief
sought against the individual defendants under § 1983. Id. at 1170 (stating that
§ 1983 cannot provide relief if defendants are not covered under Title VII).
88. Id. The court specifically ruled that no individual liability exists under
§ 1983 when the parties do not dispute the lack of individual liability under Title
VII. id.
89. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.3 (7th Cir.
1995) (citing Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., 966 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1992);
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990); Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 F.2d
312 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1988) (re-
maining silent on issue of individual liability under Title VII where court ruled on
individual defendants' violation of Title VII).
90. 966 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 324. The plaintiff was a salesperson for a construction firm. Id. at
322. He alleged that a manager, the individual defendant, illegally fired him in
violation of the ADEA. Id. The plaintiff sued both the employing entity and the
manager in his individual capacity. Id. The jury granted the plaintiff back pay and
attorney's fees. Id. The Seventh Circuit was faced with determining whether the
jury's decision applied to both the employing entity and the individual defendant.
Id. at 324.
804
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found both the employing entity and a manager, in his individual capacity,
liable under the ADEA.92 The court upheld the damages without much
discussion.9 3 In Shager v. Upjohn Co.,9 4 the court mentioned in passing
that it may have been possible for the plaintiff to recover from the individ-
ual supervisor under the ADEA, but did not directly rule on the issue.
95
Furthermore, in Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 96 the Seventh Circuit upheld Title VII
sex discrimination charges against an individual, again without directly
ruling on the issue of individual liability.97 The Seventh Circuit was, thus,
92. Id. The court stated that separating the two defendants for the issue of
willfulness was a "complication." Id. For either of the defendants to have been
held liable under the ADEA, the defendant needed to have "willfully" violated the
statute. Id. The acts of the manager were imputed to the company under the
theory of respondeat superior. Id. Because the company had failed to notify the
manager of the requirements of the ADEA, namely the age at which employees
become part of the protected class, the employer had the requisite willfulness the
statute demands. Id. Because the manager did not know of the statute's require-
ments, the court questioned whether he had the requisite "willfulness" under the
ADEA. Id. The court avoided this issue, stating that the single brief filed by the
two defendants, the employer and individual manager, did not differentiate be-
tween the two "so far as the willfulness of their violations is concerned." Id. Be-
cause the defendants treated themselves as one, the court held both of them liable.
Id. Therefore, by affirming a jury decision that held an individual liable, the Sev-
enth Circuit indirectly ruled on the issue of individual liability. Id.
93. Id.
94. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
95. Id. at 404. The plaintiff in Shager was a salesperson for the Asgrow Seed
Co. Id. at 399. Asgrow was later acquired by Upjohn Co., and so Upjohn was a co-
defendant. Id. The plaintiff alleged that his manager terminated him in violation
of the ADEA. Id. The district court dismissed the case following a summary judg-
ment motion by the defendant's companies. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed.
Id. at 407. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit discussed whether respondeat superior
liability was included in the ADEA. Id. at 404-05. The court stated that the man-
ager's actions in discriminating against the plaintiff were imputed to the employ-
ing entity. Id. at 405. In discussing the manager's actions, however, the court
suggested that it might have held the manager individually liable if the plaintiff
had included the manager in his complaint. Id. at 404. The court noted that the
inclusion of the term "agent" in the definition of "employer" could have meant
that the manager was himself liable along with the employing entity or even in-
stead of the employing entity. Id. The court, therefore, hypothesized that the
plaintiff could have sued the manager, but did not. Id.
96. 884 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1989).
97. Id. at 318-19. In Gaddy, the plaintiff had worked at the defendant's com-
pany in quality control. Id. at 314. Plaintiff alleged that the manager, who was the
individual defendant in the case, sexually harrassed her and denied her request for
overtime hours because she was a working mother. Id. The plaintiff was termi-
nated and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter after she filed a charge of discrimi-
nation with the agency. Id. The plaintiff named both the employing entity and
the manager as defendants. Id. At the second bench trial, the judge found for the
plaintiff, granting her reinstatement, back pay, lost overtime, lost seniority, attor-
ney's fees and injunctive relief. Id. at 313. The defendants appealed both the
ruling and the judge's post-trial motions. Id. The court upheld most of the dam-
ages against the defendants. Id. at 318-19. The court did so, however, without
noting that it was holding an individual liable under Title VII. Id.
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unresolved as to the issue of individual liability under the anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, as it never had an opportunity to rule directly on the issue.
98
III. AN ANALYSIS OF AIC SscuiTny
A. EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd.
AIC Security presented the Seventh Circuit with an opportunity to re-
solve the division among the district courts regarding individual liability
under the anti-discrimination statutes. 99 AIC Security Investigations, Ltd.
("AIC") was a private security firm owned by Victor Vrdolyak.10 0 AIC em-
ployed about 300 people, including the plaintiff, Charles Wessel. Wessel
worked as executive director of AIC for several years during which he suf-
fered from lung cancer.' 10 While Wessel continued to hold this top man-
agement post at AIC, he was diagnosed with a terminal form of brain
cancer.' 0 2 The defendant, Ruth Vrdolyak, took control of the company
soon after Wessel's diagnosis and fired him.'0 3 On Wessel's behalf, the
EEOC sued both AIC and Vrdolyak in her individual capacity.10 4
98. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.3 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that Seventh Circuit courts have awarded damages against individu-
als, but only when individual liability was not disputed).
99. Id. at 1280 (citing divisive district court rulings). For a discussion of the
district court cases, see supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
100. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. AIC was a security company, providing pri-
vate guards in the Chicago area. Id. AIC was a division of AIC International. Id.
Victor Vrdolyak owned AIC International and, thus, also owned AIC, its subsidiary.
Id. Victor Vrdolyak also ran AIC International and hired the plaintiff, Charles Wes-
sel, to run AIC in 1986. Id.
101. Id. Wessel was employed from 1986 to July 1992. Id. In 1987, Wessel
discovered he had lung cancer. Id. For the next five years, he continued his em-
ployment at AIC while he underwent various surgeries and treatments such as
chemotherapy and radiation. Id. During this time, he suffered from the effects of
both the illness and the treatments, including "shortness of breath from having
parts of his lungs removed, nausea from radiation and chemotherapy, and some-
what reduced memory capacity due to the effects of brain tumors." Id. He contin-
ued "essentially full time" during the course of his employment. Id.
102. Id. Wessel discovered in April 1992 that he had, in addition to lung can-
cer, metastatic brain cancer, an inoperable form of terminal cancer. Id. Wessel's
illnesses thus made him part of a protected class under the ADA. Id. For a discus-
sion of the definition of disability under the ADA, see supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text.
103. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. Victor Vrdolyak died inJuly 1992. Id. Ruth
Vrdolyak, the defendant in this case, took sole ownership of AIC and AIC Interna-
tional soon after her husband's death. Id. She ran the company on a day-to-day
basis and was aware of Wessel's illness. Id. She terminated Wessel on July 29, 1992.
Id.
104. Id. After Vrdolyak fired Wessel, Wessel filed a charge with the EEOC. Id.
The EEOC decided to sue instead of issuing a right-to-sue letter. Id. For a discus-
sion of the EEOC process, see supra note 14. Wesseljoined the action, intervening
as a plaintiff in his own interest. Id. Because Wessel's brief adopts the arguments
of the EEOC brief regarding individual liability for Vrdolyak, the EEOC and Wes-
sel will be jointly referred to as "EEOC" where appropriate within this Note. See
Brief for Appellee/Cross Appellant (Charles H. Wessel) at 16, EEOC v. AIC Sec.
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Ajury found in favor of Wessel, holding both Vrdolyak and AIC liable
under the ADA.105 The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, ruling on post-judgment motions, limited some of the
jury's awards.10 6 The trial court, however, still held Vrdolyak and AIC
jointly and severally liable. 10 7 Therefore, the district court held Vrdolyak,
the manager and owner of the employing entity, individually liable in her
personal capacity under the ADA. 10 8
On appeal, Vrdolyak asserted the defense that she could not be held
liable as an individual under the ADA.109 The EEOC, however, contended
that under a plain language reading of the ADA, the definition of an "em-
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839) (adopting and
incorporating EEOC brief).
105. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. The jury held that both AIC and Vrdolyak
violated the ADA and awarded Wessel "$22,000 in back pay, $50,000 in compensa-
tory damages, $250,000 in punitive damages against AIC, and $250,000 in punitive
damages against Vrdolyak." Id. In addition, after post-trial motions, "[t]he district
court granted injunctive relief against AIC, ordering a variety of measures to pre-
vent future discrimination." Id. AIC had to pay the $22,000 back pay, but both
AIC and Vrdolyak were held jointly liable for $50,000 in compensatory damages.
Id.
106. Id. The district court limited the amount of the compensatory and puni-
tive damages to $200,000 as required by the CRA of 1991. Id.; see 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(b) (3) (C) (1994) (limiting punitive damages to $200,000 for employers
with more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees). For a discussion of the sliding
scale approach used in the CRA of 1991, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
The court held AIC and Vrdolyak severally liable, but limited the punitive damages
to $75,000 each. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. Therefore, the total amount of
damages awarded to Wessel was $200,000, the maximum total amount under the
CRA of 1991. Id.
107. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. The district court stated that "Ruth
Vrdolyak directly participated in, and in fact made that decision [to fire Wessel]
and ordered it to be carried out. Under these circumstances defendant Vrdolyak
is not relieved of personal liability." EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., No. 92-
C7330, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *30 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 1993).
108. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. The district court rejected the Miller court
ruling as unpersuasive. AIC Security, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *29-30. For a
discussion of the Miller holding, see supra notes 26-33. The court was more per-
suaded by the holding in Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D.
Ill. 1993). AIC Security, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *29. For a discussion of the
Vakharia holding, see supra notes 62-65. The court maintained that the policy con-
cerns governing the ADA should result in individual liability:
This court agrees with [the Vakharia holding] that if the person most re-
sponsible for invidious discriminatory actions (that is, the employee who
actually discriminates) were shielded from personal liability, that person
may never be sufficiently punished or deterred. Employers, particularly
large organizations, might not be able to accurately identify all those em-
ployees who engage in wrongful conduct. Failure to identify and punish
such individuals may mean that a hostile and undeterred management
will remain in place awaiting its next victim.
AIC Security, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15025, at *29.
109. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. AIC and Vrdolyak also appealed the three
following issues: (1) admission of Wessel's videotaped deposition; (2) the jury in-
structions; and (3) the damages granted. Id. at 1282, 1283, 1285-88.
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ployer" includes "any agent," and as such, individual managers and owners
could be included in the scope of "employer."'1 0 The EEOC also argued
that although the original remedies under the ADA are those usually ob-
tainable only from an employing entity, the CRA of 1991 expanded the
types of damages available to those usually obtainable from an individ-
ual. 11I In addition, the EEOC advanced the policy arguments that hold-
ing managers and owners individually liable would better effectuate the
purpose of the ADA to discourage discrimination, as well as provide a rem-
edy to aggrieved parties where the employing entity no longer has valuable
assets. 112
The Seventh Circuit rejected the EEOC's arguments, finding instead
that the ADA and the anti-discrimination statutes do not impose liability
on persons in their individual capacity.' 13 The court stated that the inclu-
110. Id. at 1281. The EEOC relied on the "plain language" interpretation
that any agent of an employer is included within the definition of "employer." Id.
The EEOC argued that "[a] statute's plain meaning ordinarily determines its
meaning." Brief for the Appellee (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission)
at 36, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-
3839) (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835
(1990) (relying on Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980))). Therefore, reading the employment anti-discrimination stat-
utes from the EEOC perspective, any agent of a covered entity could be liable
under the ADA, Title VII or the ADEA. Id. at 37. For the definition of "employer"
under the ADA, see supra note 8. For the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the EEOC
arguments, see infra notes 119-31.
111. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The EEOC argued that the additional rem-
edies that the CRA of 1991 tacked onto Title VII and the ADA are those that are
typically obtainable from an individual. Id. Thus, the EEOC attempted to negate
Vrdolyak's argument that because the ADA only granted remedies that an employ-
ing entity could give, such as back pay and reinstatement, the drafters did not
intend to include individuals within the scope of ADA liability. Id. Although the
CRA of 1991 expanded the scope of remedies to those that are obtainable from
individuals, such as compensatory damages, it did so without discussing the liability
of individuals. Appellee's Brief at 41, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). The EEOC ac-
knowledged that "the reason for Congress's silence is far from clear." Id. The
EEOC refocused the court's attention to the definition of "employer" under the
ADA. Id. at 41-42.
112. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282 n.9. The EEOC first asserted that anti-dis-
crimination statutes "should be interpreted liberally to effectuate [their] remedial
purposes." Appellee's Brief at 42, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (citing Owens v.
Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980); Lamirande v. RTC, 843 F. Supp. 526, 528
(D.N.H. 1993); Wanamaker v. Colombian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp. 127, 135
(N.D.N.Y. 1990); Burrell v. Truman Medical Ctr., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 230, 232 (W.D.
Mo. 1989)). The EEOC continued to state that the reason Congress enlarged the
scope of recovery against those who discriminate under Title VII and the ADA was
because it knew that monetary damages deter discrimination. Id. at 42 n.16. The
EEOC also pointed out that in cases of bankruptcy, there may not be any way to
recover from the employing entity itself, and thus, the discriminating individual
must shoulder the burden of remedying the plaintiff. Id. at 42-43 n.16.
113. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282. The Seventh Circuit stated "[w]e hold that
individuals who do not otherwise meet the statutory definition of 'employer' can-
not be liable under the ADA." Id. The court noted that "our holding only applies
directly to the ADA, though it obviously affects the resolution of the very similar
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sion of the language "agent" in the definition of "employer" was to ensure
respondeat superior liability for employers based upon their agents' dis-
criminatory acts.1 14 Moreover, the court disagreed with the proposition
that the CRA of 1991 expanded the scope of "employer."' 1 5 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that Congress still maintained protections for small busi-
nesses, and noted that there was a distinct lack of legislative discussion on
the topic of individual liability where such an intended controversial
change would have been likely to spark much debate. 116 In addition, the
court dismissed the EEOC's policy arguments stating that the added pro-
tections for the disabled would be minor in light of strong disincentives
for workplace discrimination already in existence.' 17 On the whole, the
Seventh Circuit determined that holding individuals liable under the ADA
would upset the balance that Congress struck between protecting disabled
employees and minimizing the regulatory costs to employers.18
questions under Title VII and the ADEA." Id. at 1282 n.10 (citing Birkbeck v.
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994)). For a discussion of
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in AIC Security, see infra notes 119-51 and accompa-
nying text.
114. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court adopted this rationale from
Birkbeck and Miller. Id. (citing Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510; Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994)). The
court analyzed the structure of the statute and how the statute insulates small em-
ployers from its scope. Id. The court reasoned that if Congress meant to protect
smaller entities from the costs of compliance and litigation, then it could not have
intended to expose individuals to such costs. Id. Also, the court stated that be-
cause the original remedies under the ADA were equitable and those that employ-
ers traditionally provide, the drafters most likely did not intend to include
individual agents as liable parties in ADA actions. Id. For a discussion of the hold-
ing in Miller, see supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
holding in Birkbeck, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
115. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court noted that the CRA of 1991's
sliding cap system, which lowered damages for smaller employers, and the preser-
vation of the exemption for employers with less than 15 employees, showed that
Congress still maintained the protections for smaller entities. Id. Thus, in enact-
ing the CRA of 1991, it would be unlikely that Congress simultaneously sought to
enlarge the scope of "employer" to include individuals. Id.
116. Id. The court noted that there was no legislative discussion on the inclu-
sion of individual liability in the CRA of 1991, in spite of the fact that such an issue
would surely have caused controversy in both the Senate and the House. Id. The
court concluded that these factors combined made it unlikely that the drafters of
the CRA of 1991 intended such a departure from the original scope of "employer"
under the ADA. Id.
117. Id. at 1282. The court noted that because the employing entity is still
liable, the employing entity would still discourage discrimination regardless of the
lack of liability for individual managers. Id. Instead, the employer will discipline a
manager for discriminating, thus effectuating the purpose of the ADA to discour-
age discrimination. Id. The court maintained that holding individuals liable
would not be tantamount to providing managers with the right to discriminate
with impunity. Id.
118. Id. The court noted that the EEOC interpretation "upsets that balance
and distorts the statutory framework" of the ADA between discouraging discrimi-
nation and avoiding burdensome regulations. Id. at 1281.
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B. The Seventh Circuit's Logic
1. The Plain Meaning of "Employer" Under the ADA
In AIC Security, the EEOC contended that under a plain meaning in-
terpretation, the ADA's definition of "employer" included Vrdolyak. 119
The EEOC's conclusion stemmed from the premise that a "covered entity"
is prohibited from discriminating based upon a disability under the
ADA.' 20 The definition of a "covered entity" includes an "employer."'1 2'
An "employer," in turn, is defined as a "person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees ... and any agent of
such person."'122 The statutory definition of "person" includes corpora-
tions.1 2 3 Therefore, the EEOC argued that: (1) Vrdolyak was an "agent"
of AIC; (2) AIC was an "employer" under the ADA; (3) AIC was thus a
"covered entity"; (4) Vrdolyak was then an "agent" of a "covered entity";
and (5) as an "agent" of a "covered entity," Vrdolyak was within the defini-
tion of "employer" and consequently could be held liable for her discrimi-
natory acts. 124 The EEOC argued that the inclusion of the agency
language is notable because under common law principals, the corpora-
tion would still be liable for an agent's discriminatory acts absent the lan-
guage.125 Thus, the EEOC reasoned that the drafters, conscious of this
common law rule, must have intended that any agent of a corporation,
such as Vrdolyak, would be a "covered entity" under the ADA and would
be subject to liability in their individual capacity.1 2 6
119. Brief for the Appellee (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) at
36, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-
3839). The EEOC stated that the plain meaning of a statute should control unless
there is "clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary." Id. (citing Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (relying on Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980))). In
the alternative, the EEOC argued that Vrdolyak was liable as AIC's alter ego. Ap-
pellee's Brief at 43, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). For a discussion of the court's
handling of the alter ego theory and the possible loophole for district courts to
circumvent the AIC Security ruling, see infra note 189.
120. Appellee's Brief at 37, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992)). The statutory language is set forth supra note 4.
121. Appellee's Brief at 37, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(2)).
122. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (A) (Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added)).
For the statutory language of § 12111(5), see supra note 8.
123. Appellee's Brief at 37, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e(a), 12111(7)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 40 (citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.3d 398, 404-05 (7th Cir.
1990); Levendos v. Levendos, 909 F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir. 1990). For a discussion of
the common law theory of respondeat superior that courts impose on an employ-
ing entity for the actions of their employees, see infra note 128 and accompanying
text.
126. Appellee's Brief at 37, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). The EEOC high-
lighted the various cases in which the Seventh Circuit had implicitly recognized
individual liability under the anti-discrimination statutes. Id. at 38 (citing Gaddy v.
Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936,
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The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the EEOC's position.1 27 The
court stated that the purpose of the "agent" language was to insure that
employers would be held liable for discriminatory acts by their employees,
managers and agents under the respondeat superior doctrine.1 2 8 The
court found further support for this proposition in the structure of all
three anti-discrimination statutes.1 29 The three statutes limit the defini-
tion of "employer" to those employing a minimum of either fifteen or
twenty persons.13 0 Noting that the purpose of the limitation is to protect
small businesses, the court found it unlikely that Congress would have in-
tended to place the burden of liability on individuals.' 3 1
2. The CRA of 1991's Expansion of Available Remedies
The EEOC also argued that the CRA of 1991 expanded the ADA rem-
edies to include those that usually can be obtained from individuals, thus
944 (7th Cir. 1988)). Although the Seventh Circuit agreed that it had indirectly
faced the issue of individual liability under the anti-discrimination statutes, in AIC
Security the court treated the question as open. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investiga-
tions, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995) (outlining inconsistency in previ-
ous Seventh Circuit rulings). For a discussion of these Seventh Circuit cases, see
supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
127. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. The court joined "analogous decisions of
[our] sister Circuits in holding that individuals who do not independently meet
the ADA's definition of 'employer' cannot be held liable under the ADA." Id. As
this was a question of law, the court reviewed the issue de novo. Id. (citing Pilditch
v. Board of Educ., 3 F.3d 1113, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109
(1994)).
128. Id. at 1281 (citing Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510
(4th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993)).
In arriving at this conclusion, the court engaged in little textual analysis. See id.
(stating that "[C]ontrary to the EEOC's .. . argument, the actual reason for the
'and any agent' language . . . was to ensure that courts would impose respondeat
superior liability upon employers for the acts of their agents" (citing Birkbeck, 30
F.3d at 510; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587)). Instead, the AC Security court relied on the
Miller and Birkbeck courts' analysis of the statute's defintional language. Id. For a
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 26-38, 114 and accompanying text.
129. MC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court, while not delving into a lengthy
textual analysis of the ADA, looked to areas of the ADA other than the definitional
section in order to understand the full scheme of the statute. Id. The Seventh
Circuit pointed out that all three of the anti-discrimination statutes provide for
limited remedies which lends credibility to the theory that individuals were not to
be included in the scope of "employer." Id.
130. Id. Under the ADA, the scope of "employer" was limited to those em-
ploying more than 14 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. VI 1992) (limit-
ing scope of "employer" under Title VII to those employing over 14 persons); 29
U.S.C. 630(b) (1988) (limiting the scope of "employer" under ADEA to those em-
ploying over 19 persons).
131. MC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court stated that the exclusion of small
businesses "struck a balance between the goal of stamping out all discrimination
and the goal of protecting small entities from the hardship of litigating discrimina-
tion claims." Id. (citing Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587).
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making the individual liability theory available to plaintiffs.1 3 2 Conversely,
Vrdolyak argued that the CRA of 1991 favored her position that the ADA
does not impose individual liability because it instituted a "sliding cap sys-
tem" that further protected small businesses and it failed to mention indi-
vidual liability. 13 3 The court adopted Vrdolyak's interpretation of the
CRA of 1991.134
The court first noted that the original remedies under the ADA were
equitable in nature.' 3 5 Because these remedies are typically not available
from individuals, the court believed it was unlikely that Congress originally
132. Id. The EEOC noted that Congress must have been aware of the contro-
versy surrounding individual liability under Title VII at the time of the enactment
of the CRA of 1991. Brief for the Appellee (Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission) at 42 n.15, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir.
1995)' (No. 93-3839) (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)
(assuming Congress has knowledge of existing law); Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97 (1979) (same)). The EEOC reasoned that Congress's
failure to mention the issue was an implicit acceptance of decisions holding indi-
viduals liable. Id. at 42.
133. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel in Sup-
port of Defendants-Appellants at 14-16, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839). The Equal Employment Advisory Coun-
sel (EEAC) is a private association that represents corporations and employers in
employment litigation. Id. at 2. The EEAC filed a brief on Vrdolyak's behalf. Id.
The EEAC first argued that the equitable remedies originally available under the
ADA were proof that individual liability was not intended by the drafters. Id. at 14-
15 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986) (Marshall,J., concur-
ring) (noting that equitable remedies of Title VII are type that run against employ-
ing entity); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 772 F. Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. Il1. 1991)
(holding equitable remedies not intended to apply to liability of individuals)).
The EEAC then dismissed the fact that the CRA of 1991 remedies are those that
run against individuals and focused instead on the limitations of the sliding cap
system that exempts small businesses. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (A)
(Supp. IV 1992) (stating that sum of amount of compensatory damages awarded in
case of employer with between 15 and 100 employees is $50,000). The lowest cap
is set for employers with between 15 and 101 employees. Brief Amicus Curiae at
15, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). Therefore, the EEAC reasoned that individuals with
no employees of their own are exempt from the CRA of 1991. Id. For a detailed
discussion of the sliding cap system under the CRA of 1991, see infra notes 138-41
and accompanying text.
134. MC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. Specifically, the court determined "that the
district court erred in not dismissing Vrdolyak as a defendant." Id. at 1282. The
court did not directly address the "alter ego" theory the EEOC put forth, because
the EEOC did not assert it at the trial court level. Id. at 1282 n.l1. The court did
not find that line of reasoning persuasive, stating that if the corporate veil were
pierced Vrdolyak might be held liable for corporate liability, but that it would not
affect an analysis of individual liability. Id.
135. Id. at 1281; see also Brief Am icus Curiae at 14-15, MC Security (No. 93-
3839) (noting that original statute did not contemplate individual liability due to
its remedy structure). Such remedies included back pay, reinstatement and other
equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (allowing for equitable relief); Brief Amicus
Curiae at 14, MC Security (No. 93-3839). The ADA not only adopted the Title VII
"employer" definition but also the remedies that Title VII offered. Id.; see also 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (remedies include back pay and equitable relief such as
reinstatement).
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intended to include individual liability under the ADA. 13 6 While the CRA
of 1991 did expand the remedies to those that may be collected from indi-
viduals, the legislature remained silent as to the issue of individual liabil-
ity. 13 7 Also, in enacting the CRA of 1991, Congress instituted a "sliding
cap system" which placed a ceiling on the amount of damages a plaintiff
could recover.1 38 The lowest cap is for employers retaining between four-
teen and 101 employees. 139 Individuals were not mentioned at all in the
"sliding cap system."' 40 Congress's silence on the liability of individuals, as
well as the lack of a set cap for individuals, persuaded the court that Con-
gress did not intend to expand the scope of the "employer" definition
under the ADA. 14 1
136. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court stated that the EEOC basically
recognized that the original ADA/Title VII damages are not typically obtainable
from individuals. Id. In its brief, however, the EEOC actually claimed that equita-
ble relief is sometimes obtainable from an individual rather than the employing
entity. Appellee's Brief at 42 n.15, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank, 477 U.S. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring) (recognizing court's power to issue
injunction against individuals); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir.
1988) (permitting recovery of back pay against individual where recovery against
company was impossible)).
137. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The CRA of 1991 granted plaintiffs addi-
tional remedies such as compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a) (2). Despite the inclusion of additional remedies, the AIC Security court
determined that silence on the part of Congress with regard to individual liability
establishes that no major expansion of the scope of "employer" under Title VII
and the ADA was intended by the expansion of remedies. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at
1281.
138. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281; see also Brief Amicus Curiae at 16, AIC Secur-
ity (No. 93-3839) (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
139. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The sliding cap system limited liability to
$50,000 for employers who have between 14 and 101 employees. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b) (3) (A); Brief Amicus Curiae at 15-16, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). For a
dicussion of the damage caps for other employer sizes, see supra note 32.
140. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 128i. The EEAC argued that if the CRA of 1991
made no such cap for entities employing less than 15 people, then an individual
who has no employees (such as a manager) would have no liability. Brief Amicus
Curiae at 15-16, AIC Security (No. 93-3839).
141. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The EEOC countered this argument by
stating that individuals are liable for any amount the jury awards because they were
not included in the cap system. Id. at 1281 n.6; see also Appellee's Brief at 41-42,
AIC Security (No. 93-3839) (arguing that cap system applied only to employing enti-
ties and not to individuals). The EEOC argued that Congress's intent is unclear,
and that its concern may have been "calibrating liability" for businesses because
awards against companies have "different implications for the nation's economy
than do large damages awards against wealthy individuals such as Vrdolyak." Id. at
41. The court rejected the EEOC's arguments as "highly improbable." AC Secur-
ity, 55 F.3d at 1281 n.6. The EEOC did not address the potential liability of less
wealthy lower-level managers that would be affected by a decision to expose man-
agers to individual liability. See Brief Amicus Curiae at 17, AIC Security (No. 93-
3839) (noting that individual managers without same resources as company with
15 or more employees could not likely afford costs of such litigation).
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3. The Anti-Discrimination Policy Governing the ADA
Additionally, the EEOC made several policy arguments.1 4 2 The
EEOC contended that' holding managers individually liable for their dis-
criminatory acts would effectuate the intent of Congress in discouraging
discrimination and would insure that those who discriminate will not go
unpunished.1 43 The EEOC also pointed out that holding managers indi-
vidually liable would guarantee an aggrieved party proper restitution when
the employing entity is no longer solvent. 144
Conversely, Vrdolyak argued that individual liability would have nega-
tive effects on equal employment opportunity laws. 145 Vrdolyak claimed
that individual liability would hamper managers' abilities to legitimately
judge potential or current employees based upon their job-related abili-
ties. 14 6 Vrdolyak further pointed out the unfairness of holding managers
with limited resources to the same legal standard as large corporations.' 47
The Seventh Circuit did not find the EEOC's arguments compel-
ling.14 8 The court stated that individual liability is not needed to provide a
142. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282; see also Appellee's Brief at 42-43 n.16, AC
Security (No. 93-3839) (attacking policy arguments made in Brief Amicus Curiae,
AIC Security (No. 93-3839)).
143. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282; see also Appellee's Brief at 42-43 n.16, AC
Security (No. 93-3839) (noting that discriminating party should pay, not "plaintiff
who has been victimized").
144. Appellee's Brief at 42-43 n.16, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). The EEOC
stated that "where a company is bankrupt, a victim of discrimination will be unable
to recover at all unless recovery is available against the individual who discrimi-
nated." Id.
145. Brief Amicus Curiae at 16-18, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). The court did
not directly accept these policy theories and avoided discussing them. AIC Security,
55 F.3d at 1282. The court instead discounted the EEOC's policy arguments and
reserved its own analysis to primarily one of structural, and some textual, interpre-
tation. Id. at 1279-82. The court also pointed out that its decision conformed to
the great weight of existing case authority. Id. at 1281-82.
146. Brief Amicus Curiae at 17-18, AIC Security (No. 93-3839). Vrdolyak con-
tended that the purpose of the anti-discrimination legislation is to force managers
to evaluate employees based only on their qualifications and merits, rather than on
"statutorily-protected characteristics-such as race, gender, and disabilities." Id.
Vrdolyak's argument is based on the presumption that managers will be pressured
into avoiding employment decisions that would make them individually liable
when there is a threat of a discrimination suit. Id.
147. Id. at 17. Vrdolyak contended that many managers have no greater re-
sources than the claimants themselves. Id. She also noted that litigation costs the
plaintiff nothing if the suit is filed by the EEOC. Id. Even when a case is dismissed,
the individual defendant may incur "substantial legal fees which cannot be recov-
ered unless the case can be shown to have been 'frivolous, unreasonable, or with-
out foundation."' Id. (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978)).
148. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282. The court rejected the EEOC's "Chicken
Little-esque argument." Id. Conversely, the court made no mention of the more
extensive policy arguments by Vrdolyak concerning the impact on managers' dis-
cretionary abilities. Id.; see Brief Amicus Curiae at 16-18, AIC Security (No. 93-3839)
(making policy arguments against imposing individual liability).
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disincentive for managers to discriminate.1 49 It noted that the employing
entity is still liable, and it can deter discriminatory behavior through train-
ing and disciplinary action.1 50 The court found that although expanding
the scope of liability may have some effect in discouraging discriminatory
acts, the societal costs would upset the balance that Congress sought to
achieve between protection for employees and discretion for managers. 15 1
C. Clarity for the Seventh Circuit and a Model for Other Jurisdictions
The Seventh Circuit has established a bright line rule that lends cer-
tainty to questions of individual liability under the ADA as well as other
federal anti-discrimination statutes. 152 The approach taken by the court
balances social and economic interests while relying on the structure of
the statute for support rather than on vague policy arguments. 15 3 Such an
approach is sure to guide other jurisdictions to an equally balanced
resolution.1 54
149. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282. The court agreed with the EEOC that the
inclusion of individual managers under ADA liability would further deter discrimi-
nation as the risk of litigation increased. Id. The court, however, stated that the
increase in deterrence would be marginal, and that the costs to individual defend-
ants would outweigh the benefits, upsetting the balance of the statute. Id. The
court noted that regardless of these policy arguments, it should not interpret the
statute in such a way that "flies in the face of [the statute's] structure." Id.
150. Id. The court said that an employing entity has the "proper incentives to
adequately discipline wayward employees." Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993)). The court, however, did not consider how
individuals in top management positions, such as Vrdolyak, would discipline them-
selves. See id. at 1279 (describing Vrdolyak as owner and "sole shareholder" of AIC
and its parent company and manager of its "day-to-day" operations).
151. Id. at 1282. In weighing policy considerations, the court considered that
anti-discrimination statutes do have "broad remedial purposes and should be inter-
preted liberally." Id. The court, however, decided that a "liberal construction does
not mean one that flies in the face of the structure of the statute." Id. (citing
Hudson v. Soft Sheen Prod., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 132, 136 (N.D. Ill. 1995)).
152. Id. at 1282 n.10 ("We emphasize that our holding only applies directly to
the ADA, though it obviously affects the resolution of the very similar questions
under Title VII and the ADEA." (citing Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d
507, 510 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994))). Courts have subsequently referenced the AIC Secur-
ity holding as affecting Title VII and the ADEA. For a discussion of the influence
of the AIC Security decision in the district courts under the anti-discrimination stat-
utes, see infra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
153. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court refused to upset the "balance
between the goal of stamping out all discrimination and the goal of protecting
small entities from the hardship of litigating discrimination claims." Id. (citing
Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510; Miller, 991 F.2d at 587). See generally PAUL BURNSTEIN, Dis-,
CRIMINATION, JOBS, AND POLITICS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNrrY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1985) (outlining policy
considerations that went into anti-discrimination employment law).
154. For a discussion of the impact of AC Security on other jurisdictions, see
infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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The AIC Security court properly looked to the ADA statutory provi-
sions for guidance.1 55 The court evaluated the plain meaning of the term
"agent" in the definition of "employer" and determined that it existed in
order to guarantee respondeat superior liability for agents' and employ-
ees' acts of discrimination.1 5 6 Such a reading is appropriate in the context
of discrimination legislation. 15 7 The anti-discrimination statutes limit lia-
bility to those entities employing a statutorily defined minimum number
of employees. 15 8 As an individual, a manager has no employees person-
ally, and thus, should not be included within the scope of the statute. 159
Also, the original remedies available under the anti-discrimination
statutes were typically forms of equitable relief, which are not obtainable
from individuals. 160 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an individual
manager could be subject to liability given that the statute's form of reme-
dies could not be obtained from individual managers. 16 1
While the CRA of 1991 did alter the structure of remedies under the
ADA and Title VII to include those that may possibly be obtained from an
individual, there is no evidence that it intended to alter the scope of the
statutes' coverage. 162 The court points out that such a change would not
155. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. For a discussion of the court's analysis in
AIC Security, see supra notes 119-51 and accompanying text.
156. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281 (citing Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510; Miller. 991
F.2d at 587). For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the term "em-
ployer" and its possible inclusion of "agents" in AIC Security, see supra notes 8-17
and accompanying text.
157. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281.
158. Id. at 1279; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). The ADA pres-
ently limits the definition of "employer" to those entities employing more than 14
persons. Id. Note that the ADA exempted those employing less than 25 employees
for its first two years, then phased in its lower employee requirement. Id. Title VII
also limits its scope to those employing more than 14. Id. § 2000e(b). The ADEA
exempts those employing less than 20 persons. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
159. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel in
Support of Defendants-Appellants at 13, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839) (arguing that exemption of small employ-
ers shows that Congress had no intent to include individuals that had no employ-
ers themselves). If an individual personally employed 15 or more persons, he or
she might, independently, fall under the definition of "employer." AIC Security, 55
F.3d at 1280 n.2. In AIC Security, Vrdolyak was not personally the employer of the
plaintiff. Id. at 1279.
160. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (limiting
remedies under Title VII to injunction, back pay and reinstatement); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (adopting remedies of Title VII for ADA).
161. AC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281; see Brief Amicus Curiae at 14-15, AIC Security
(No. 93-3839). The "make whole" remedies of the ADA and Title VI are generally
not obtainable from individuals. Id. at 15. Therefore, the original remedial
scheme of the statutes before the CRA of 1991 would not then have subjected
individuals to liability. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281.
162. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. For a discussion of various court opinions
which noted the glaring lack of legislative history concerning the issue of individ-
ual liability, see supra notes 70-72. Note that the CRA of 1991 type remedies were
available in the ADEA in its original form. ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOY-
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have taken place without any congressional discussion. 163 Because such
an expansion of coverage would affect a vast number of voters, there cer-
tainly would have been controversy between sponsors and opponents of
the bill. 164 Therefore, the omission of individuals in the cap system is fur-
ther evidence that Congress did not consider the possibility of including
individuals under the anti-discrimination statutes. 16 5 Also, the CRA of
1991 continued the tradition of protecting smaller employers in its "slid-
ing cap system" for damage awards. 166 If Congress intended to protect
smaller employing entities due to their minimal resources, it is unlikely
that Congress intended to subject individual managers, who may also have
minimal resources, to liability. 167
There may be some strong policy arguments that support individual
liability, but more compelling legal arguments weigh in favor of protecting
individual managers. 168 While the EEOC properly argues that tradition-
ally courts have interpreted anti-discrimination legislation broadly, the
overall statutory scheme should control when appropriate. 169 In the past,
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 80-85 (1992). The ADEA adopted its remedies from
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988), which allowed
compensatory and punitive damages. BELTON, supra, at 80-85. To recover these
types of remedies, however, one must show a willful violation under the ADEA. Id.;
see also Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., 966 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1992) (not-
ing that court cannot impose liability on defendant unless defendant acted will-
fully). For a discussion on Price, see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
163. AICSecurity, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court said that "[i]t is a long stretch to
conclude that Congress silently intended to abruptly change its earlier vision
through an amendment to the remedial portions of the statute alone." Id.
164. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 4-7 (1990); H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 101-485, pt.3, at 4-7 (1990); SEN. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989). These reports
concern discussions surrounding the development of the ADA, but fail to address
the issue of supervisor liability. Id.
165. MC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court stated that Congress's "omission
implies it did not consider individuals liable." Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,
Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 n.2. (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Brief Amicus Curiae at 15, AIC
Security (No. 93-3839) (arguing that CRA of 1991 exempts individual managers).
The EEAC observed that if the lowest cap is for entities employing over 14 persons,
then individual managers who themselves have no employees are not subject to the
provisions. Id.
166. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (A) (Supp.
IV 1992) (stating employer with between 15 and 101 employees is not required to
pay more than $50,000 in compensatory damageg).
167. See Brief Amicus Curiae at 17, MC Security (No. 93-3839). The EEAC
noted that resources increase for employing entities as their size increases, but
supervisors may still have almost equal resources as the plaintiff. Id.
168. MC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282 (rejecting EEOC's "short parade of hor-
ribles" after noting EEOC was arguing against weight of case authority). For a
discussion of the EEOC's policy arguments, see supra notes 142-44 and accompany-
ing text.
169. See Appellee's Brief at 42, AIC Security (No. 93-3839) ("This statute, like
other anti-discrimination statutes, should be interpreted liberally to effectuate its
remedial purposes." (citing Ownes v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (10th Cir. 1980);
Lamirande v. RTC, 834 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D.N.H. 1993); Wanamaker v. Colum-
bian Rope Co., 740 F. Supp. 127, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); Burrell v. Truman Medical
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courts have expanded anti-discrimination legislation when necessary to ef-
fectuate its intent.1 70 Here, however, the only purpose in expanding the
number of potential defendants is to give plaintiffs more options to obtain
remedies.1 71
By its terms, the scope of the ADA is sufficiently broad in covering
many employing entities.1 72 Furthermore, the disincentives for managers
to discriminate are already in place. 173 Employing entities are unlikely to
tolerate behavior by managers that exposes them to liability, and so man-
agers are unlikely to engage in acts that expose themselves to termina-
tion.1 7 4 Moreover, there are already several existing common law
principals which hold managers personally liable for their discriminatory
acts.17 5 Preventing employment discrimination does not require enforc-
ing individual liability and doing so would only marginally increase the
ADA's deterrent effects.1 76
While the benefits of individual liability in discouraging discrimina-
tion are minimal, the implications for managers and supervisors could be
disastrous.17 7 Educating and training managers and supervisors on the
Ctr., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 230, 232 (W.D. Mo. 1989))); see AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282
("We do not doubt that the employment discrimination statutes have broad reme-
dial purposes and should be interpreted liberally .... ").
170. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (expanding
Title VII's prohibited practices to those having disparate impact upon protected
groups, as well as those practices having disparate treatment). In Griggs, one of the
Supreme Court's most important employment law cases, the court ruled that em-
ployment tests that are facially neutral, but that have a disparate impact on a racial
group, violate Title VII unless the defendant employer can show the test is a busi-
ness necessity and related to evaluating job performance. Id.
171. AC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. A major benefit to plaintiffs in imposing
individual liability for managers is that plaintiffs would still be able to recover even
where the employing entity has gone bankrupt. See id. at 1281 n.9 (stating that this
benefit is not strong enough to "upset the structure Congress has set up").
172. See JOHN PARRY, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT MANUAL 21
(1992) (outlining employer responsibilities under ADA). Parry notes that Title I
of the ADA is similar to the other anti-discrimination statutes, but that it requires
even more than Title VII and the ADEA in its provisions concerning "reasonable
accommodations." Id. For a discussion of the "affirmative action" that employers
must take to make the workplace accessible to those with disabilities, see GEORGE
W. JOHNSTON, ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HANDBOOK 55-64 (1992).
173. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282.
174. Id.
175. See Grant v. Lone Star, 21 F.3d 649, 651 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that
individuals could still be liable under state tort and contract law), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 574 (1994); see also William L. Kandel, Financial Exposure of Managers for Person-
nel Decisions, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. (Sept. 22, 1993) (discussing tort liability for man-
agers). For further discussion on the liability of managers under state tort
theories, see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
176. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282.
177. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel in Sup-
port of Defendants-Appellants at 16-18, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839). The EEAC stated that many managers do
not have the resources to adequately defend themselves against discrimination
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requirements of equal employment opportunity law is the responsibility of
the employing entity. 178 The burden for managers to comply with the
myriad of federal regulations is daunting enough. 179 To also shift the bur-
den of liability to them for work done on behalf of their employer would,
as the court pointed out, upset the balance that Congress has clearly devel-
oped through its statutory scheme. 180
The AIC Security ruling brings the Seventh Circuit into line with the
majority trend in the circuit courts in protecting individuals from liability
suits. Id. at 17. The EEAC was particularly bothered by the fact that unsupported
claims would be costly to litigate. Id. The Seventh Circuit also noted that holding
managers individually liable would increase litigation as "plaintiffs saw more poten-
tially liable parties and had a greater incentive to sue in marginal cases." MC Secur-
ity, 55 F.3d at 1282.
178. See MAv GREEN MINER & JOHN B. MINER, EMPLOYER SELECTION WITHIN
THE LAW 362-66 (1979) (advising managers in executing human resource func-
tions under equal employment opportunity ("EEO") laws). The authors discuss
how top management can design training and incentives for managers to set and
reach their EEO goals. Id. The authors admit that "[t]he most difficult part of
EEO training for managers is 'awareness' training, which attempts to sensitize
managers to some of the barriers and stereotyped attitudes [about protected class
employees]." Id. at 362. The authors believe, however, the benefits of educating
employees to their duties under employment statutes outweigh the substantial
costs. Id.
The Seventh Circuit has ruled that an employing entity that fails to educate its
managers on EEO requirements thereby fulfills any "willfulness" requirement. See
Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing employing entity liable for willful violation of ADEA due to corporation's fail-
ure to warn manager of duties under ADEA). In Price, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed a decision that held an employer liable for a willful violation of the ADEA
by a manager. Id. The Seventh Circuit said that the "willfulness" requirement of
the ADEA was fulfilled even though the agent himself may not have been aware of
the ADEA requirements. Id. The court stated that "the employer's failure to in-
form [the manager] concerning the fundamental requirements of the age discrim-
ination supplies, as we have just seen, the requisite willfulness." Id. The court did
not need to reach the issue of "willfulness" for the manager himself, because they
treated both the corporation and the manager as one entity, due to the fact that
they filed only one brief. Id. If, however, the employer's failure to train the man-
ager is actionable as willful, even where the manager's actions may not be willful, a
natural conclusion follows that the employer has a duty to train his or her employ-
ees in EEO law. But see DANIEL R. LEVINSON, PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MANAGERS AND
SUPERVISORS FOR CORPORATE EEO POLICIES AND DECISIONS 25-29 (1982) (noting
that employer has no legal duty to train managers on EEO law, but that employer's
best interests are served by doing so).
179. SeeARTHUR GUTMAN, EEO LAW AND PERSONNEL PRACTICES, at xix (1993).
In his foreword, Gutman states "[t] he human resource management field has been
dominated for the past 30 years by the various Congressional mandates generally
lumped together as 'civil rights legislation.' Nothing has come close to having the
impact on personnel management practices as have the various segments of civil
rights legislation dealing with employment practices." Id.
180. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282; see Brief Amicus Curiae at 9-10, AIC Security
(No. 93-3839) (stating that federal anti-discrimination statutes were not designed
to hold managers "personally liable for actions committed within the scope of their
duties on their employer's behalf").
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under the employment anti-discrimination statutes.18 1 Recent circuit
court decisions have rejected plaintiffs' attempts to include individuals as
defendants in Title VII and ADEA litigation.1 8 2 The rationale used by all
of these courts follows the Miller v. Maxwell's International, Inc. court's line
of reasoning.18 3 The Seventh Circuit has properly continued this trend by
applying the Miller rationale to the ADA.18 4 The anti-discrimination stat-
utes are similar in nature, dictating a consistent interpretation of the stat-
utes as a body of law.18 5 Equally important is the need for consistent
interpretation among jurisdictions.18 6 Such an approach will enable em-
ployers to develop a uniform policy between their various offices and
plants, especially when they are located throughout many regions of the
nation and subject to the jurisdiction of numerous courts.18 7
181. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280 ("[Flour [circuit courts] have rejected indi-
vidual liability .... One Circuit has recognized individual liability.") (citations
omitted).
182. Id. For an analysis of these circuit court decisions, see supra notes 23-50
and accompanying text. The most recent circuit court decision finding individual
liability is the Sixth Circuit'sJones case in 1986. AIC Security, at 1280 (citingJones v.
Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986)). For a discussion of the
holding of Jones, see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
183. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280-82; Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403-04 n.4
(I1th Cir. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Co., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994);
Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l,
Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993). The AC Security, Lomax, Birkbeck and Grant
courts all rely on Miller as persuasive authority and quote from Miller extensively.
See, e.g., AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1280-82 (citing or quoting Miller eight times). For
an analysis of the Miller court's holding, see supra notes 26-33 and accompanying
text.
184. AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281. The court stated "we find the more recent
and more detailed [circuit court] decisions persuasive." Id.
185. See id. at 1280 ("Courts routinely apply arguments regarding individual
liability to all three [discrimination] statutes interchangeably."). The fact that the
statutes all have essentially the same definition of "employer" lends credibility to
the theory that the definitions should be interpreted uniformly. For a comparison
of the three statutes' definitions of "employer," see supra note 2 and accompanying
text. Also, the EEOC is in charge of enforcing the provisions of all three statutes.
See DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, TEXT AND CASES 431 (9th ed.
1994) (discussing function and framework of EEOC). The EEOC is the regulatory
body that enforces Title VII, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, the ADEA, Section 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act and Title I of the ADA. Id. Therefore, it would be appropri-
ate for courts to require the EEOC to apply a consistent "employer" definition
between the statutes the EEOC enforces.
186. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Counsel in
Support of Defendants-Appellants at 16, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839) (proposing that uniformity in employ-
ment law is preferable to uneven decision-making prompted by fear of litigation).
187. Id. (asserting that discouraging discrimination "requires consistency and
uniformity in the implementation of employment policies"). The EEAC stated
that without uniformity, managers would, out of fear of litigation, fall back on
judging employees by their disability, which the ADA was intended to discourage.
Id. at 17.
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IV. CALMING THE STORM OF EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION:
THE IMPACT OF AIC SEcU"rIT
AIC Security will have several beneficial effects in the Seventh Circuit
and elsewhere. 188 First, AIC Security resolves the issue of individual liability
under the ADA, as well as Tide VII and the ADEA, in the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 189 The court appropriately made a broad ruling that lends clarity
188. See Hardwick v. Curtis Trailers Inc., 896 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Or.
1995) (relying on AIC Security as persuasive authority for rejecting individual liabil-
ity under ADA); Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Ctrs., P.C., 886 F. Supp. 1443, 1446
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (ruling that it is bound by precedent of AIC Security to dismiss Title
VII charges against individual defendant).
189. Lynam, 886 F. Supp. at 1446. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois strongly objected to the AIC Security ruling, but be-
grudgingly followed it. Id. ("Although this court continues to be of the opinion
that Congress' intent to eradicate discrimination in the workplace is best served by
recognizing individual liability under the anti-discrimination statutes .... we are
mindful of our subordinate position as a district court . . . ."). Despite its ruling,
the court proceeded to outline the arguments in favor of finding individual liabil-
ity. Id. at 1446-48.
In subsequent decisions, this district court adhered to the AIC Security ruling
with less discussion. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 93C6454, 1995 WL
452977, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1995) (dismissing ADA claim against individual
supervisor); Cameli v. O'Neal, No. 95C1369, 1995 WL 398893, at *1 (N.D. Ill.July
2, 1995) (rejecting individual liability under Title VII and ADEA); Lynn v. Acme
Metals, Inc., No. 94C5633, 1995 WL 370230, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 1995) (re-
jecting individual liability under Title VII). But see Curcio v. Chin Enters., Inc., 887
F. Supp. 190, 193-94 (N.D. 111. 1995) (stating cause of action against restaurant
employer on basis of "alter ego" theory). In Curcio, the district court refused to
follow dicta in the AIC Security opinion that stated the Seventh Circuit would likely
reject an "alter ego" argument by a plaintiff to include an individual defendant as
the "alter ego" of the corporation. Id. (citing MC Security, 55 F.3d at 1282 n.11).
The district court stated that "[u]ntil such time as this issue has been fully devel-
oped and addressed by the Seventh Circuit," the district court would still hold
individuals liable under the anti-discrimination statutes as long as they were the
"alter ego" of the corporation that employed the plaintiff. Id. at 194 (citing Fabis-
zak v. Will County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 94C1517, 1995 WL 698509, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 12, 1995) (holding that individual who acts as more than supervisor and iden-
tical to employer may be held individually liable under Title VII)). In Curcio, the
individual defendant was not only a supervisor, but also the "controlling share-
holder and the main decision maker, and in effect left no avenue for the employ-
ees to object to his misconduct." Id. The district court then refused to dismiss the
Title VII charges against the individual because he was "actually identical" to the
employer. Id.
In MC Security, however, the Seventh Circuit denied individual liability against
an individual defendant who had recently taken over as "sole shareholder of AIC
and [its corporate parent] ... and began operating AIC on a day-to-day basis." AIC
Security, 55 F.3d at 1279. In the footnote referenced as "dicta" by the district court,
the Seventh Circuit stated:
In any case, we see no good reason why it should make any difference for
our analysis whether Vrdolyak was AIC's alter ego. She might be effec-
tively liable if the corporate veil were pierced, and as sole shareholder she
will necessarily absorb the pinch from AIC's liability, but as to her individ-
ual capacity liability it does not matter even if she was AIC's alter ego.
Id. at 1282 n.11. For a further discussion of case law on liability of owners and
shareholders under the alter ego theory, see Brief for the Appellee (Equal Employ-
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and consistency to a previously muddled area of employment law. 190 Man-
agers will be permitted to act without apprehension, which will lead to
rational decision-making, decreased fear of liability and greater effi-
ciency. 19 1 With disincentives already in place, there is little evidence that,
without individual liability, managers will begin to discriminate with
impunity. 19 2
The holding in AIC Security will help guide other jurisdictions that
have not faced the issue of individual liability under the ADA to a moder-
ate balance between protection for the disabled and freedom of discretion
for managers. 193 While there have been previous circuit rulings under
Title VII and the ADEA, the AIC Security decision now provides persuasive
circuit-level authority for other jurisdictions to continue this trend of mod-
ment Opportunity Commission) at 43-44, EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55
F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-3839). See generally Milton Bordwin, Piercing the
Corporate Veil (Liability for Corporate and Contract Claims), 84 MGMT. REV. 8 (1995)
(discussing how board members and owners may be held liable regardless of incor-
porated status of company).
190. For a discussion of the split between the district courts, see supra notes
51-76 and accompanying text.
191. See Francis A. Morris, Legal Beat: Boss May Be Personally Liable if Firing
Violates Disability Law, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1995, at B1 (reporting on district court
ruling in AIC Security). This newspaper article notes that holding managers per-
sonally liable will discourage risk-taking on the part of' managers. Id. The article
also predicts that "'[s]upervisors will be reluctant to exercise their judgment in
hiring, firing and promoting employees."' Id. (quoting Douglas McDowell, Gen-
eral Counsel of the EEAC): see also Brief Amicus Curiae at 9, AC Security (No. 93-
3839) (stating that EEO law would be "frustrated, not furthered" by individual
liability). The EEAC also noted that it would make "uniformity and consistency"
difficult, as well as put "great pressure" on managers, in personnel decisions. Id.
192. See HENRY H. PERRrir, JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 12
(1991) (outlining common law actions applicable to employment practices). Ex-
amples of common law torts that a supervisor might be liable under include inten-
tional interference with contractual relations, fraudulent misrepresentation,
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Even if managers
were individually liable for their actions under the ADA, it may be possible that
they could in turn sue their employer for indemnification for failing to properly
train them to comply with the regulations. See DANIEL R. LEVINSON, PERSONAL LIA-
BILITY OF MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS FOR CORPORATE EEO POLICIES AND DECISIONS
25-29 (1978) (confirming, in EEAC publication, that employer has no legal duty to
train employees and management on EEO law, but employer's best interests are
served by doing so). The EEAC supported, as a matter of policy, the indemnifica-
tion of EEO managers who "perform their responsibilities in good faith" but none-
theless face litigation from aggrieved employees. Id. at 25. The EEAC argued that
this would encourage managers to "carry out duties and obligations with confi-
dence." Id.
193. See, e.g., Hardwick, 896 F. Supp. at 1039 ("Based on the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in its analogous decision in Miller, and the Sixth Circuit's [sic] reasoning
in [EEOC v. AIC Security], I am persuaded that the better rule is that individuals
who do not otherwise meet the statutory definition of 'employer' cannot be liable
under the ADA.").
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eration to the ADA, lessening the substantial burden of employment regu-
lations that managers face on a daily basis.1 94
Finally, the court has sent a strong message to the EEOC. 195 In AIC
Security, the EEOC pushed for expansion of the ADA's coverage against
the weight of the case authority. 19 6 In soundly rejecting the notion of
individual liability under the employment anti-discrimination statutes, the
Seventh Circuit has discouraged the agency from pursuing its own inter-
pretation of the "employer" definition. 19 7 AIC Security will thus discourage
costly, inefficient and unnecessary litigation. 19 8
William L. Morrissey, Jr.
194. Id. Courts have also recently relied on the holding of AIC Security to
deny plaintiffs relief against individuals under statutes other than the ADA. See
Ball v. Cook County Sch. Dist., 889 F. Supp. 492, 493 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (rejecting
individual liability under Title VII "[i]n light of the overwhelming authority on
point") (citing AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281; Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4
(11th Cir. 1995); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991)); see
also Leykis v. NYP Holding, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 986, 990, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing
AIC Security in dismissing ADEA claims against individual)); Bakal v. Ambassador
Constr., No.CIV.A.94-0584, 1995 WL 447784, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1995) (citing
AIC Security in dismissing Title VII claims against individual). AIC Security may also
be interpreted as rejecting a broad statutory interpretation of other definitions
than employer. See Neff v. American Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1069 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("Neff's argument in this case would require us to bend 'operates' too
far beyond its natural meaning for us to rely on the canon of statutory interpreta-
tion requiring that we interpret civil rights legislation liberally." (citing AIC Security,
55 F.3d at 1281-82)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996).
195. See AIC Security, 55 F.3d at 1281 (holding individual liability is not
permited under ADA). After rejecting the EEOC's statutory interpretation, the
court stated: "Lacking the support of the structure arguments, the EEOC and Wes-
sel bring forth a short parade of horribles." Id. at 1282. The court then flatly
rejected those EEOC policy arguments as "Chicken Little-esque." Id.
196. See id. at 1281. ("The EEOC and Wessel, fighting primarily against the
weight of authority, rely primarily on their own 'plain language' interpretation of
the ADA's definition of employer.").
197. Id. The definition of "employer" under the EEOC's own regulations
does not specify whether individuals are liable under the anti-discrimination stat-
utes. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991) (defining "employer" under EEOC and excep-
tions thereto). The EEOC's own manual is also lacking in the area of individual
liability. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 8, at 1-2 (defining "em-
ployer" without mentioning liability of individual managers). Doubts remain as to
the EEOC's desire to continue its attempts to expand the definition of "employer"
to include individual managers. See Supervisor Isn't Liable, WALL ST. J., May 24,
1995, at B4 ("A spokesman for the EEOC said the agency was still reviewing the
decision and it was too soon to determine if it would appeal.").
198. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 406 (7th Cir. 1990). In Shager,
the Seventh Circuit noted that free market forces are strong enough to discourage
discrimination, without the unnecessary costs of litigation. Id. The court said that
if the defendant company discriminated against a good employee in its discharge
process, the company "will pay a price in the competitive marketplace, and that the
threat of such market sanctions deters age discrimination at lower cost than the
law can do with its cumbersome and expensive machinery, its gross delays, its fre-
quent errors, and its potential for rigidifying the labor market." Id. at 406-07. The
court, regardless of its dim view of the legal system as a place for rectifying discrim-
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ination, upheld the plaintiffs ADEA rights against the employer, noting that "this
sanguine view of the power of the marketplace was not shared by the framers and
supporters of the [ADEA]." Id. at 407. Note that some critics say the ADA itself is
ineffective. See Barbara S. Dimmitt, ADA: Revealing the Legal Impact, Shaping Em-
ployer Tactics, 13 BUSINESS & HEALTH 27 (1995) (citing increase in unemployment
rate of disabled persons from 66% to 68% during 1994).
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